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Abstract

Modern courts have evolved around two central legal traditions—the adversarial and the inquisitorial. The two traditions have historically reflected
different approaches towards consent and authority or towards conflict resolution and strict application of the law. Yet with the blurring of boundaries
between the two legal traditions, and alongside various reforms in adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems, new practices of judicial conflict resolution within the courtroom have developed. This Article will compare the two
legal traditions and examine the assimilation of ideologies and procedures
typical to conflict resolution processes into the work of judges, as they strive
to end civil legal cases by ways other than traditional legal ruling (i.e., by
settlement).
This Article argues that the integration of inquisitorial-like judicial practices within an adversarial environment contributes to the evolution of
proper conditions for rich judicial conflict resolution. This is as opposed to
contexts in which inquisitorial systems internalize conflict-resolution procedures into the legal system, yet the shift in how judges perceive their role is
less significant. Applying practices foreign to the courtroom—practices that
focus on the broader interests of the parties—minimizes the original and
clear separation that the founders of the alternative dispute resolution movement envisioned as they developed alternative conflict-resolution procedures
intended to be completely separate from the legal world.
The new sphere in which the adversarial judge practices, alongside rapid
developments in dispute-resolution procedures, is a unique arena which enables dispute resolution under the auspices of authority. Consequently, and
as litigants’ expectations of the legal process have changed accordingly, the
center of gravity of the legal process has shifted from the evidentiary stage
to the preliminary stages (such as pretrial and discovery). This process has
inevitably led to changes in the roles of litigators, rules of procedures, relative burdens of proof, and the overall management of litigation. The development of this unique sphere bears great potential for the resolution of complicated legal conflicts and for the development of innovative hybrid models
for law and mediation.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the possible manners of implementation of disputeresolution ideologies and procedures in the work of judges with an eye towards ending civil conflicts by methods other than traditional adjudication.1
1 Throughout this Article, the terms “traditional adjudication” and “settlement” will be
used interchangeably.
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These possibilities are examined in relation to two main legal methods: the
inquisitorial tradition of the continental legal systems based on civil codification2 and the adversarial tradition of common law systems,3 which is based on
an evolution of judicial decisions developed through a system of binding precedents.4
Our inquiry is set against the backdrop of the institutionalization of alternative dispute resolution procedures (ADR), such as mediation and arbitration—both by means of diverting cases from within the legal system to procedures conducted outside the system and by way of conducting such
procedures within the legal system by dispute settlers who are not judges.
Such procedures have been promoted worldwide over the past few decades by
the ADR movement. This movement has a vision of reaching comprehensive
conflict resolution, or resolution that solves disputes in a broader and more
just manner compared to cases that are resolved through judicial determination.5 However, the ADR movement has only partially succeeded in achieving
The term “inquisitorial” is borrowed from the ecclesiastical practice, in which the
representatives of the pope conducted active investigations to discover infidels in the faith,
and all by virtue of unique powers given to them for such purpose. This method determined
that the inquisitor, who drew his power from the sovereign, is omnipotent in the quasijudicial investigation proceeding, when examining the origin of suspects, investigating
them, reaching conclusions and deciding their fate. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN &
ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 6–38 (3d ed. 2007).
3 For the historical development of common law in England and the United States, see
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 180–255 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); A. W. B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77 (A. W. B. Simpson ed., 1973); Gerald Postema,
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part 1), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155
(2002); Gerald Postema, Philosophy of the Common Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 588 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2004).
These are two age-old traditions; the first, which has more ancient roots, developed in Europe, while the second was formed in medieval England and distributed to colonies under
its control. These traditions have gained a foothold among technologically and culturally
developed countries and, accordingly, have also been exported to other countries around
the world.
4 The terms “adversarial” and “inquisitorial” reflect the extent of the judge’s involvement in the trial. The terms “common” and “continental” refer to the method in which the
judge takes part in the creation and application of the law.
5 The ADR movement began with the aspiration to achieve broad justice by a discourse
of interests based on problem solving, and with the attempt to solve the workload problem
and overcome systemic problems of the courts. The courts have a vital interest in referring
cases to external dispute resolution proceedings, distinct from the benefits it has for management of the conflict itself and expansion of the feasibility of an effective solution.
Whether the judge’s perception originates from an ideology that advocates the consensual
resolution of disputes, or whether it originates from pragmatic considerations—since for
the judge, a case on their docket which is referred to mediation lessons the workload—
referral is consistent with the judicial policy to encourage the mediation and amicably
2
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its goals.6 Nevertheless, as legal systems have become more aware of the advantages that can be gained from alternative procedures, and as these procedures have continued to evolve,7 the institutional structure of courts has
changed. Courts themselves have become institutions that can better foster the
new ideology. The practice of managerial judges8 has developed, and so has
the role of special magistrates who promote settlement.9 In addition, “problem
solving courts” have been established10 and a doctrine of therapeutic judging
has developed,11 as has judicial practice with conflict resolution as the main
purpose of its procedures.12
This Article examines the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
within traditional courts. In these courts, parties arrive expecting a judicial
ending the conflict and is also consistent with a broad social and philosophical concept
which is based on consent rather than decision. Aharon Barak, Al Hagishur [On Mediation], 3 SHAAREI MISHPAT 9 (2002) (Isr.).
6 Michal Alberstein, Yeshuv Sichsuchim Shiputi: Al Torat Hamisphat Me'ever
Lamachloket [Judicial Conflict Resolution: Towards Jurisprudence Beyond Dispute], DIN
UDVARIM 11, 17, 23–24, 38–39 (2018) (Isr.); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of
Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or “The Law of
ADR”, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1991).
7 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (indicating a
change in the role of the traditional adversarial judge, and the development of the managerial judge since the 1970s); Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach
About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (coining the term “litigotiation”);
Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994) (addressing the claim that “most cases settle,”
and pointing to the phenomenon of promoting settlement proceedings by judges as a significant component in their judicial role).
8 Resnik defines the “managerial movement” as a plan to expedite the resolution of the
dispute and resolution of the case, and to persuade litigants to settle instead of laying their
case down for the decision of the court. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 376–80. See also E.
Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
306 (1986); Michal Alberstein, Judicial Conflict Resolution (JCR): A New Jurisprudence
for an Emerging Judicial Practice, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 879 (2015); Ayelet
Sela et al., Judges as Gatekeepers and the Dismaying Shadow of the Law: Courtroom Observation of Judicial Settlement Practices, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 83 (2018).
9 For discussion on magistrates, see infra note 56.
10 See PROBLEM SOLVING COURTS – SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Richard L. Wiener & Eve M. Brank eds., 2013); Donald J. Farole Jr. et al., Applying ProblemSolving Principles in Mainstream Courts: Lessons for State Courts, 26 JUST. SYSTEM J. 57
(2005).
11 Karni Perlman, Tafkid Hashofet Haterapoiti Vehetiachsuto Lera'aionot Measkoholat
Harealism Hamishpati [The Therapeutic Judge - A New Role in Court and Its Relationship
to the Ideas of the Legal Realism School], 26 MEHKAREI MISHPAT 415 (2010).
12 See MICHAEL S. KING, SOLUTION-FOCUSED JUDGING BENCH BOOK (2009),
https://aija.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Solution-Focused-Judging-BenchBook.pdf.
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ruling: an authoritative solution that absolves them of the responsibility to
reach a resolution to the conflict on their own. Judges themselves have been
trained to make such rulings and usually lack any experience or training in
conducting dispute-resolution procedures. Additionally, the courtroom, where
dispute-resolution processes occur, lacks those basic characteristics that suit
such activity and was traditionally designed in a way that reinforces the authority of the court and judge.
The application of dispute-resolution terminology and procedures within
the courtroom, or alongside the legal procedure, has been referred to in various ways over the years: managerial judging,13 judicial dispute resolution, judicial conflict resolution, judicial settlement, and more.14 This Article assumes that we live in an era typified by changes in the perceived role of
judges, both in the way the judge sees the boundaries and scope of their role,
and in the perception of the parties and their counsel,15 including an increased
tendency toward judicial discretion. Accordingly, this Article will compare
the two legal systems in their function as hosts of the phenomenon whereby
the judge becomes an active participant in a procedure that is directed towards
settlement—in other words, procedure not directed towards judicial ruling in
its narrow and common sense, yet not purely mediation either.16

13

Resnik, supra note 7, at 376–77.
See Mordehai (Moti) Mironi, Al Migbalot Hapishur Veal Besorat Hagishur [On the
Limitations of Conciliation and the Promise of Mediation], 6 DIN UDVARIM 487 (2012)
(Isr.) (characterizing judges’ attempts to lead parties to a settlement as “judicial conciliation,” making a distinction between this procedure and mediation). Regarding the development of the settlement-oriented judicature and Judicial Conflict Resolution (JCR) as a
jurisprudence for resolving conflicts within the court, which precedes consent (over coercion) as a leading value for the application of justice, see supra note 5; see also Judith
Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgment, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of
Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994); Karni
Perlman, Shofet Megasher? al Shfita Hesderit Ubein Matsui Leratsui Bamisphat Haisraeli
[A Settlement Judge? On Judicial Dispute Resolution and a Proposal for Israeli Law], 19
MISHPAT VEASAKIM 365, 389 (2015) (Isr.).
15 See supra note 8; Perlman, supra note 11; Takanot Hadin Haezrahi [The Civil Procedure Regulations], 5778–2018, KT 8085 422 (Isr.) [hereinafter New Civil Procedure
Regulations] (emphasizing the judge’s scope of activity, as the director of the proceeding,
in a way that allows her to more effectively direct disputes toward a decision thereon, in
circumstances where the dispute was not previously resolved amicably).
16 See Michal Alberstein, Measuring Legal Formalism: Reading Hard Cases with Soft
Frames, 57 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 161 (2012); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK
(2009). For the spread of the phenomenon that is not typical only of the United States and
other countries operating under the common law system, see Herbert M. Kritzer, Disappearing Trials? A Comparative Perspective, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 735 (2004).
There is extensive writing criticizing the role of the judge as a mediator, whether as a judge
whose exclusive role is mediation, or a judge hearing a case for provisional remedies, or a
mediating judge who also hears the case and rules thereon. See Wayne D. Brazil, Judicial
14
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Judicial activity in promoting settlement within the courtroom17 is based
partially on institutional-organizational design that incentivizes judges to act
in this way and partially on intuitive interventions initiated by judges themselves.18 For example, Net-Hamishpat, the computerized system for docket
management that is used by the Israeli court system and available to the public, creates an organizational incentive for judges to use alternative means to
bring parties to settle cases.19 The publication of court rulings provides opportunities for the public to scrutinize the work of judges and their reasoning, and
at times leads to wide public critique of the legal system.20 The fact that court
rulings are regularly published makes judges more cautious in their writing.21
Moreover, any case that is settled is considered a success from an institutionalorganizational point of view, as the legal system seeks to reduce judicial backlog and allow judges to devote their resources to more complex cases.22 Judicial activity in promoting settlement is especially significant in light of the
ongoing trend toward minimizing formal legal procedures23 and the
Mediation of Cases Assigned to the Judge for Trial: Magistrate Judges Celeste F. Bremer
and Karen K. Klein, 17 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 24, 25 (2011).
17 As a rule, mediation is no longer perceived as an alternative tool for resolving disputes, but as one that is institutionally integrated into the work of the courts, within the
framework of various mediation programs and in the existence of mandatory mediation in
some legal systems. See Council Directive 2008/52/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3 (dealing with
specific aspects of mediation on civil and commercial issues) [hereinafter Directive
2008/52[. See also ELAD FINKELSTEIN, HAMISHTAR HAMISHPATI SHEL HALICH HAGISHUR
[THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE MEDIATION PROCEEDING] 213 (2007) (Isr.); §§ 99A–99K, Civil
Procedure Regulations, 5744–1984, KT 4685 2210 (Isr.) [hereinafter Old Civil Procedure
Regulations] (regulating the Information, Acquaintance and Coordination (IAC) meeting
to examine the possibility of settling a claim in mediation, and authorizing the court to
impose a sanction on a party who did not appear for the IAC meeting, see Section 99G(c)).
18 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 7, at 1342–46 (showing studies that judges are highly
motivated to avoid reaching judicial decisions in the cases before them, and this is one of
the reasons why most cases end in a settlement).
19 See Yair Sagy, Lamenazheah Shir Mizmor? Likraht Nithuah Ergoni shel Ma'arechet
Batei Hamishpat Beisrael [Orchestrating the Judiciary? Towards an Organizational Analysis of the Israeli Judiciary], 16 MISHPATUMIMSHAL – HAIFA U.L.J. 65, 95–98 (2014) (Isr.)
(arguing that the court's system is an “organization,” as defined in the theory of organizations and putting an emphasis on processes of dissemination of information within the organization, including decision-making procedures and the integrative organizational incentive that is inherent in the publication of court rulings (the informative paradigm)).
20 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 7, at 414–16.
21 See Amnon Reichman et al., From a Panopticon: The Use and Misuse of Technology
in Regulation of Judges, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 589, 629–33 (2020); ISSACHAR ROSEN-ZVI,
HA'ALICH HAEZRACHI [THE CIVIL PROCESS] 90 (2015) (Isr.).
22 See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Bizur Ma'arechet Hasphita Beisrael: Hatafkid Hanistar shel
Sidrei Hadin [The Decentralization of the Israeli Judicial System: The Hidden Role of Procedure], 46 MISHPATIM – HEBREW U.L.J. 717 (2017) (Isr.).
23 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 646–48 (1994). This article describes processes in the years 1938–
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“vanishing trial” phenomenon,24 where legal determination following a full
trial has become a last resort, at least in some legal systems.25
This Article will examine the ways in which the promotion of ADR by
judges is related to the characteristics of the legal system—whether adversarial or inquisitorial—given the structural and organizational changes that the
system has undergone. This Article will explore how these changes impact
the traditional role of the judge, taking into account the legal environment in
which judges were educated and practice, and how these changes play out in
the routine management of litigation in civil cases.
The integration of practices originating from the inquisitorial tradition
within an adversarial judicial environment creates the grounds for efficient
judicial activism and initiatives which may promote consent among parties.
Such judicial activity is made possible, among other reasons, by the procedural aspects inherent to common law systems, alongside rapid increases in
judicial discretion and the unique role of the judge in this framework. Such
leeway is not present in the civil system, where judges play a more technical
role, and where their discretion is limited to applying the legal code as the sole
conceptual basis for resolving the conflict at hand. Therefore, judges’ initiatives to promote settlement in inquisitorial legal systems will manifest,
mainly, in directing parties to out-of-court conflict-resolution processes or in

1990 in which the change in the civil procedure of federal courts in the United States (rules
which were later assimilated into State courts) resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of cases that were judicially decided and most cases filed ended by way of the claim
being summarily dismissed without prejudice, settlement in or outside of the courtroom
and other arrangements. The trial does not vanish (as opposed to the vanishing trial phenomenon) but is rather important in the preliminary proceedings, where many decisions
are issued that help the parties formulate a position for settlement. See also Michal Alberstein & Nourit Zimerman, Judicial Conflict Resolution in Italy, Israel and England and
Wales: A Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of Judges’ Settlement Activities, in
COMPARATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 298 (Maria Federica Moscati et al. eds., 2020).
24 Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, Langbein, supra
note 6; Peggy Fulton Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the TwentyFirst Century: The Evolution of the Revolution in Problem Solving, 42 GA. L. REV. 717,
747 (2008). With respect to pleas, see Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004). Regarding the reasons for the phenomenon in England and Wales, see Robert Dingwall & Emilie Cloatre, Vanishing Trials?: An
English Perspective, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 51. This process reflects cultural and structural
changes and economic constraints that have affected the justice system in recent decades.
25 The multiplicity of arrangements and the vanishing trial phenomenon do not exist in
the same extent in all legal systems. For example, while in the United States less than 1%
of cases end in a full decision, in Italy most cases are decided. See Alberstein, supra note
6, at 23; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 7; Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 310–
11. See also Keren Weinshall-Margel et al., Yetsirat Madad Meshkalot Tikim Leha'arachat
Haomes Hashiphoti Beisrael [Creating a Case Weights Index for Assessing the Judicial
Workload in Israel], 44 MISHPATIM 769 (2015) (Isr.).
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convincing the parties to consent to a certain proposed outcome that is in accordance with relevant legal code.26
The expansion of the realm of judicial discretion in the adversarial procedure taken together with the dissemination of inquisitorial-like tools,27 mainly
the pretrial stage, creates hybridization. In effect, it turns the adversarial procedure into fertile ground for the promotion of dispute-resolution procedures
conducted by judges who also rule on the case. Such procedures usually promote narrow consent and do not fully implement the deep perceptions and
ideology of the field of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, such procedures do
provide an efficient tool that promotes consent among parties and extends the
boundaries of the legal realm as we know it. The center of gravity of the civil
case thereby shifts from determination of legal and evidential controversies at
trial (i.e., evidential hearings and cross-examination) to settlement during the
preliminary stages of the process.28
Part II of this Article will initially review the differences between the civil
and the common law systems and the role of the judge within each. In Part III,
we will briefly discuss the blurring of boundaries between the two legal systems and how they have borrowed from one another, thereby influencing the
role of judges in both systems and giving rise to hybridization. Part IV will
explore conflict-resolution procedures within specific adversarial legal systems, examining the United States, Israel, and England. Each system will allow us to draw different conclusions regarding the implementation of mediational frameworks and inquisitorial tools within the work of judges. This
Article will use Israel as a prominent example of the trend described here, in
light of a substantial reform recently adopted in the Israeli rules of civil procedure. This will enable us to closely analyze a few examples of continentallike procedures adopted by a common law legal system and assimilated into
the adversarial process, including the authority of judges in the pretrial stage,
judgment by way of compromise (according to rule 79A of the Israeli Courts
Law), and the doctrine of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.29 These techniques are applied at different stages of judicial intervention. The pretrial stage
serves as a preliminary ground where the judge may attempt to employ conflict-resolution procedures. Judgment by way of compromise is a judicial tool

26 To learn about the role of the inquisitorial judge from the examination of discovery
proceedings, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and Role of the Judge in Civil Law
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017 (1998).
27 Even if they are not borrowed from the procedures applied in civil code countries,
they still allow for a wide range of intervention and active action on the part of the judge
in the procedure of the case being conducted before her or in the nature of the issues that
require a decision.
28 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 22, at 736–41.
29 While this doctrine was developed within the adversarial system, its characteristics
resemble judicial activism that is more typical of inquisitorial judges.
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that may be used during any stage of the legal process30 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court is integrated into the final judicial ruling itself. We will
then examine judicial conflict-resolution procedures in other adversarial systems: England and Wales and the United States. The role of the judge in the
continental tradition will be presented in Part V, where we will review codification that expands the judge’s discretion and their authority to act as conciliators and mediators in this tradition. We will contextualize the limited
scope of judicial discretion of the inquisitorial judge and briefly examine specific legislation that authorizes the judge to perform dispute-resolution activities within the courtroom or to direct parties to an out-of-court dispute resolution process, mainly mediation. Part VI will conceptualize the phenomena
described regarding the two systems, especially in the adversarial setting,
where a marked shift of the center of the legal process to its preliminary stages
can be clearly identified. The implications of this phenomena will also be discussed. Finally, we will present our conclusion regarding the role of judges
and the future of civil legal procedures more generally.
II. THE INQUISITORIAL AND ADVERSARIAL METHODS
A. Discerning Principles
The attitude towards counsel, litigants, and judges in each legal tradition
offers varying grounds for the assimilation of dispute-resolution procedures
within the courtroom. This section will review the advantages and disadvantages of each system in this regard, providing examples from legal systems
in various countries which can clearly be identified as maintaining either the
adversarial or inquisitorial traditions.
While continental law is based on structured ideology, common law has
developed in fragments as a result of the historical circumstances in England
throughout the years, and is still maintained as such.31 The adversarial system
is typically described as striving for “justice on the merits,” while the inquisitorial system aspires to provide “access to justice” for all.32 This distinction
30 Chemi Ben-Noon & Amos Gabrieli, Iikov Hadin at Hapshara? Lebikoret Seif 79a
Lechok Batei Hamishpat, Hatashmad-1984 [Will the Law Override Settlement? Critique
of Section 79A of the Courts Law, 5744-1984], 46 HAPRAKLIT 257, 260 (2003) (Isr.); Menachem (Mario) Klein, Hatza'a Leshimush Benuscha Madait Letzorech Chishuv Aritmeti
shel Psak Din Lefi Seif 79A(a) of the Courts Law [Proposal for Use of a Scientific Formula
for Arithmetic Calculation of a Judgment Under Section 79A (a) of the Courts Law], PSAK
DIN – ISRAELI LAW WEBSITE (Oct. 27, 2008) (Isr.), https://tinyurl.com/qpfmjgr.
31 This tradition was influenced by a liberal and even neo-liberal worldview later on.
See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 97.
32 Adrian A. S. Zuckerman, Justice in Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil Procedure, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3, 12,
16–18 (A.A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999).
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originates both from the different litigation costs in each system,33 as well as
the time required to reach judgments.34 These characteristics provide context
for the extent of the cooperation of different legal systems with the movement
toward alternative dispute resolution.35
The civil law tradition predates the common law tradition, and its origins
are attributed to the publication of the twelve tables of Roman Law in 450
BCE.36 Civil law is the most common legal system worldwide, but it exists
mainly in Europe, Latin America, and many parts of Asia and Africa.37 The
civil law tradition supports the principle of separation of powers and the perception that the judiciary should completely avoid any intervention in legislation. Conversely, in the common law tradition, judicial intervention in the creation and interpretation of laws is legitimate and even desirable.38
33

Emery G. Lee III, Law Without Lawyers: Access to Civil Justice and the Cost of
Legal Services, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 499 (2015); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(2004); REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON ‘ACCESS TO JUSTICE’ (Adrian A. S. Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995); HARRY WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO
THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 78–90
(1996); LITIGATION, COSTS, FUNDING AND BEHAVIOUR: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW (Willem H. van Boom ed., 2017); Matthias Kilian, Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role
of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broadening Access to Justice: The German Experience, 30
J.L. & SOC’Y 31 (2003). There are many differences in the costs of conducting proceedings
between common law countries. While in England and the United States trial costs are very
high, especially relative to the size of the case, in Israel the order of costs does not reflect
the real cost of litigation, and the court has a broad discretion with respect to awarding
costs and setting their amount. §§ 511–12, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
See also Keren Weinshall & Yifat Travolus, Psikat Otsaot Misphat Behalichim Ezrachiim
[Awarding Trial Costs in Civil Procedures], 46 MISHPATIM 763 (2017) (Isr.); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Attorneys’ Fees in a Loser-Pays System, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2014).
34 A trial as lengthy as to amount to unreasonableness is not a just trial. See Moshe Gal,
Reforma Besad’a - Hakdama [A Reform in Civil Procedure – Introduction], 9 MISHPATIM
AL ATAR 1 (2016) (Isr.).
35 The ADR movement enables the classification of disputes and the adapting of the
forum to the dispute, in order to streamline the legal system. MICHAL ALBERSTEIN, TORAT
HAGISHUR [THE THEORY OF MEDIATION] 74 (2007) [hereinafter ALBERSTEIN, THE THEORY
OF MEDIATION]; Alberstein, supra note 6, at 39; Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer,
Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2006); JA Jolowicz, Adversarial
and Inquisitorial Models of Civil Procedure, 52 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 281, 289 (2003);
Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Process Within the Framework of the
World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282 (1993).
36 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 2.
37 Id. at 2–4.
38 Parliamentary legislation is subject to judicial review and thus the judge contributes
to the shaping of the legal system. In this way, the sovereign is limited and obligated to
carry out its duty, under the watchful eye of the judicial authority, which has the ability to
decide whether an action of a governing body is within the range of legality. Conversely,
continental law prohibits judges from interfering in matters unrelated to the trial itself, in a
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The desire of modern citizens to be subject to decisions based on human
principles of justice39 is in keeping with the perception of law as a collection
of primary and secondary rules.40 According to this conception, legal norms
originate from within society and formal law should reflect these very norms.
The role of the judge is to seek the truth and apply the law, having allowed
the parties to present factual and legal arguments in the manner and scope
determined by the procedural rules of each system. Each legal tradition has
then designed its procedures accordingly, in the way that best promotes the
search for legal truth and procedural efficiency.
Some argue that the adversarial system has been developed as an optimal
mechanism for the resolution of disputes, but not necessarily for revealing the
truth.41 Given this claim, this Article will examine whether the characteristics
manner that creates a clear dichotomy between the independent legal fabric and the administration of State and sovereign authority. Id. at 16–17.
39 ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 34–35.
40 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d ed. 2012). Hart presents a perception
whereby modern law starts with a relatively homogeneous society, in which social norms
and conventions develop in terms of primary rules. These are enforced in a small community through criticism and social pressure on those who do not comply therewith, and are
perceived by its members as a basis for appreciation and criticism. The primary rules are
not sufficient when disputes arise as to the question of their existence and scope, as well as
in the question of how to apply them in concrete disputes and adapt them to changing
circumstances. In response to these rules, secondary rules have developed—the rule of
identification, the rule of judgment, and the rule of change—that characterize the transition
of the community to a more pluralistic state framework, with the law being a unification
of primary and secondary rules. See also the perceptions of Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz
as described in J. W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (2d ed. 2004); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 2009). But see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
41 Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 283–87; Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 311;
see ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 95, 115–17. The conflict stems from a different view of
cognitively biased parties regarding their rights and the clash that results therefrom. The
assumption underlying the dispute is that in a sphere where there are fixed and limited
resources, an advantage given to one necessarily leads to another’s disadvantage. Hence
the need to search for an empirical truth, which alone can give preference to one type of
need, value, or purpose over the other type. Even if there is a clear distinction between
factual and legal truth and the purpose that each one of them represents, the pursuit of truth
was perceived as the essence of the adversarial procedure. See Nina Zaltzman, “Emet
Uvdatit” Ve”emet Mishpatit – Meniat Meida Mebeit Hamishpat Leshem Hagana al Arachim Chevratiim [“Factual Truth” and “Legal Truth” – Denying the Court Information to
Protect Social Values], 24 IYUNEI MISHPAT 263 (2000) (Isr.). See also Ray Finkelstein, The
Adversarial System and the Search for the Truth, 37 MONASH. U. L. REV. 135, 136 (2011).
Finkelstein believes that although truth is the purpose of the adversarial system, such goal
is not achieved in the way the system is conducted in Australia, where only a fundamental
change therein towards a concept of dispute management can and will give it tools to
achieve the truth. The truth, according to the writer’s approach, can therefore be illustrated
in a way that is not necessarily comparable. See also Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for
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of the adversarial system are indeed more amenable to dispute-resolution processes. That is, this Article will determine whether adversarial systems are
geared toward ending conflicts, even at the cost of, as critics might perceive,
foregoing the aspiration to bring justice or reveal the truth. Conversely, this
Article will ask whether judges in inquisitorial systems, who actively take part
in seeking the truth, are therefore limited in their inclination toward taking
part in any alternative procedure, which does not necessarily end with a clear
determination of legal and factual truth.
The discussion of the role of judges in the two legal traditions assumes that
judges’ decisions are based on rational grounds, and that judges’ conclusions
are formed in light of the arguments and justifications that are brought before
them by the parties. Legal thinking is rational, both essentially and formally,
and distinguishes itself from emotion42 or intuition in a way that meets the
expectations of parties and is aligned with the authority at the heart of the role
of the judge.43
B. Two Traditions: Characteristics and the Roles of Different Actors
The adversarial system is characterized by significant control over the procedure by the parties, while maintaining minimal judicial intervention in the
process.44 The ideological basis for this procedural design is the protection of
individual liberties in a democratic society.45 The practical objective is derived from the perception that the parties are the main stakeholders in the process. More than any external party (who they did not choose, like the judge),
the parties hold the best interest to present their case in the optimal and least
costly manner. When the parties’ overall interests are represented in the best
manner possible, the judge is provided with the full picture in a way that

Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). It is also interesting to see
Chemi Ben-Noon, Hataiot Cognitiviot Vehachlatot Shiputiot Intuitsia Vehashiva Sdura
Bemelachto shel Hashofet [Cognitive Biases and Judicial Decisions Intuition and Methodical Thinking in the Judge’s Work], 5 SHAAREI MISHPAT 177 (2010) (Isr.), which deals with
cognitive biases in the judges’ discretion when making decisions.
42 See Yofi Tirosh & Adam Shinar, Empathaia Metakenet [Affirmative Empathy], 15
LABOR SOC. L.J. 37 (2018) (Isr.) (discussing the judicialization of empathy and the setting
of normative standards that require employers to consider empathy in their treatment of
employees, along with the difficulties found by the writers in the use of empathy in the
legal sphere).
43 ALBERSTEIN, THE THEORY OF MEDIATION, supra note 35, at 45.
44 ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 97.
45 Id. at 95–97; Jerry Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885, 907 (1981).
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facilitates reaching a worthy legal outcome.46 It is the conflictual environment
that affords the parties the opportunity to present the whole of their argument
with the goal of uncovering the truth.47
The parties’ control over the litigation process manifests in their choice of
how to open the case, how to frame arguments in their briefs (which they are
then bound by), which witnesses are called to testify, the manner of examination of witnesses, and the overall pace and management of the case.48 A key
feature of the parties’ control over the process is their ability to raise any argument they wish in their pleadings without the need for any kind of evidentiary support at the preliminary stage.49 Consequently, the actual disagreements between the parties are in effect exaggerated because they are based on
the understanding that the legal struggle between the parties will ultimately
end on a middle ground tolerable to both parties. From the outset, this dialectic
forms a problematic starting point for negotiation towards settlement, making
it difficult for any dispute settler, especially during the early stages of litigation, to separate the wheat from the chaff in order to determine the actual
points of dispute between the parties (a necessary stage for any resolution process). Litigation of this sort in court entails significant costs in extensive legal
fees and resources, expert witness time, and other expenses.50
Judges in common law systems hold wide discretion in their application
of the law. Various movements in American law in the previous century created models of judicial decision-making which involve judicial discretion,
balancing principles of the law with purposes of the law, and the search for
proportionality and complex formulae in judicial decisions.51
46
Dudi Schwartz, Techulato shel Ikaron Tom-Halev Beseder-Hadin Haezrachi [The
Application of the Principle of Good Faith in Civil Procedure], 21 IYUNEI MISHPAT 295,
306–07 (1998) (Isr.).
47 See sources and accompanying text cited supra note 41. Wigmor’s writing applies
this rationale to describe the benefits of cross-examination as a tool for exposing the truth.
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES (1904); ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 36–41. Jolowicz, on the other hand,
argues that while the cross-examination is likely to expose lies in the testimony, the claim
that it can expose the hidden truth, i.e., those facts that were not revealed in court, is farreaching. See Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 283. See also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (1978).
48 See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 307 n.28 (describing the processes of litigants controlling the entire proceeding).
49 This is except where the regulations require attaching certification affidavits at the
stage of filing the initial pleadings. E.g., § 258H, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra
note 17.
50 See Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 DUKE J.
COMPAR. & INT’L. L. 61, 63–65 (2003).
51 These models were also assimilated in the international courts of the European Union
and gained a foothold in Israel with regard to the use of purposive interpretation and other

2022] CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES WITHIN THE COURTROOM 101

These tools have strengthened the status of judges. They have transformed
them from serving as the mouthpiece and emissary of the legislature to participating as distinguished partners of the legislature, partners who exercise
discretion in their application of the law.52 This process has evolved while
balancing a change in values with the strict framework of the law, accompanied by considerations of public policy and the desire of the judiciary to serve
as an effective player in processes of societal improvement. The judge in a
common law system, faced with critique of the formalities of legal rules, operates within a field of discretion while deciding any conflict. Such leeway
allows for the passing of more abstract rules since their interpretation is at the
hand of judges. This role—of “law creators” who apply the law in an instrumental manner and balance principles anew—awards judges a highly significant role, empowers them, and even turns them into role models as they create
precedents and shape legislation.53
Due to the central role of lawyers in managing the adversarial process and
the role of the judge as a “supervisor” who restrains herself from intervening
in the proceedings,54 the number of judges required in the system is relatively
low.55 In addition, there are judges who are not jurists56 who sit, for example,
tools of balance and discretion. For more information on judicial discretion and the deviation of the legal text from formalist principles, see POSNER, supra note 16; MENACHEM
MAUTNER, YERIDAT HAFORMALIZEM VEA'ALIAT HA'ARACHIM BAMISPHAT HAISRAELI [THE
DECLINE OF FORMALISM AND THE RISE OF VALUES IN ISRAELI LAW] (1993) (Isr.); AHARON
BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans., 2005); SHLOMO LEVIN,
LIHIYOT SHOFET [TO BE A JUDGE] (2009) (Isr.); Michal Alberstein, Hara'ayon Hapragmati
Bamishpat Ubeyeshuv Sichsuchim: Anatomia shel Torot Misphat Mishtanot [The Pragmatic Idea in Law and in Conflict Resolution: Anatomy of Evolving Jurisprudential Theories], 5 MISHPAT VE’ASAKIM 55 (2006) (Isr.).
52 For the distinction between the image of the law as the goddess of justice that decides
between the parties and the sovereign who walks the land and states the law, see Owen M.
Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979).
53 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 34–35. Note that the common law
develops, in practice, through lawyers and judges and not necessarily in academia or parallel studies. See Adam Hofri-Winogradow, Professor of Law at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, Roman and ‘Continental’ Law in and Before the Age of Codification (lecture as
part of the course titled Systems and Traditions in Law) (Jan. 8, 2011).
54 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 307–08.
55 MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS: TEXT, MATERIALS
AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW 312 (3d ed. 2007).
56 In the courts of England and Wales, magistrates, also known as Justices of the Peace
(JPs), serve in the courts—these are volunteers without legal education who serve as judges
in cases dealing with specific offenses (for example, summary offenses) and sometimes in
family courts—and are authorized to decide in the frameworks defined for them by law
(for example, a sentence of up to 12 months’ imprisonment). The magistrates have other
powers such as issuing search warrants to the police and other authorities, they undergo
basic and brief legal training throughout their term, they are accompanied by magistrates
with at least three years of experience, and they receive ongoing advice from expert legists.
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in unique conflict resolution procedures.57 This tradition allows for the coexistence of several legal systems in the same territory: state instances alongside instances not run by the state. For example, rabbinical or church instances
are awarded the same source of authority.58 This approach stems from legal
pluralism, which is typical to the common law system and in fact defines it.59
Rules of procedure in systems with adversarial characteristics are designed
to expropriate from the judge, as much as possible, the ability to determine
the course of the litigation process, limiting the judge, as well as the litigants
themselves.60 The determination of the scope of the dispute and the information on which the judge will base her decision are both put in the hands of
the litigants as an inherent characteristic of the adversarial process.61 This
framework defines and maintains external rules for its officials, thereby decentralizing and limiting their power. Rules of procedure are designed to control for potential procedural chaos which can lead to injustice. The purpose of
the procedural rules is to lead the parties, and especially the judge, down a
clear, structured path which begins with filing the lawsuit, continues in its
management, and ends with a court ruling. Each party has an equal procedural
opportunity to present its arguments in accordance with the procedural framework. This is a mechanism of procedural justice intended to prevent the imposition of the government’s values through the management of the process
by the government’s agent on the bench (i.e., the judge). The rules of procedure in the adversarial system thus serve as the “watchdog,” protecting the
essential rights of the litigants.62
Magistrates, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY (2022) (UK), https://www.judiciary.uk/aboutthe-judiciary/who-are-the-judiciary/magistrates. See also R. H. Maudsley & J. W. Davies,
The Justice of the Peace in England, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 517 (1964).
57 See § 2, Labor Court Law, 5729–1969, SH 553 70 (Isr.) (“[j]udges and representatives of the public shall be appointed to the court.”).
58 See, e.g., § 1, Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts Law, 5714–1953, SH 134 163 (Isr.).
59 Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Pluralism Mishpati Beisrael [More on Legal Pluralism in
Israel] 23 IYUNEI MISHPAT 559–77 (2000) (Isr.); Adam Hofri-Winogradow, Hitatzmut
Hapluralism Hamishpati Beisrael: Aliyatam Shel Batei Hadin Hahilchatiim Ledinei Mamonot Bamigzar Hatzioni-Dati [The Accelaration of Israeli Legal Pluralism: The Rise of
the New Religious-Zionist Halachic Private Law Courts], 34 IYUNEI MISHPAT 47, 59, 65–
68 (2011) (Isr.).
60 Oscar G. Chase & Vincenzo Varano, Comparative Civil Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 210, 212, 220 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds.,
2012); Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 289; Neil Andrews, The Adversarial Principle: Fairness
and Efficiency, in REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON ‘ACCESS TO JUSTICE’ 169 (A.
A. S. Zuckerman & Ross Cranston eds., 1995); SHLOMO LEVIN, TORAT HAPROTSEDURA
HA'ERZRAHIT MAVO VE'EKRONOT YESOD [THE THEORY OF CIVIL PROCEDURE –
INTRODUCTION AND BASIC PRINCIPLES] 121–33 (1999) (Isr.); ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at
21–24, 97–98.
61 Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 289; Andrews, supra note 60.
62 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 306.

2022] CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES WITHIN THE COURTROOM 103

Under the inquisitorial tradition, the situation is entirely different. The procedures of the inquisitorial system expresses a clear preference toward the
principle of equality over the principles of liberty and autonomy.63 The
judge—whose role is to examine the facts according to the relevant code—is
in control of the litigation process, and the parties and their counsel play a
very limited role.64 The latter submit their pleadings, append the evidence, and
recommend witnesses who can potentially support their case. From this point
on, control over the process is given to the judge, who actively participates in
the search for truth, examines the evidence, and constructs the court file (dossier), which is based on written documents. The weight of oral testimony is
less significant than that of written evidence; the judge is the one who searches
for relevant witnesses, questions them,65 and, if necessary, appoints expert
witnesses. She does so all under the supervision of the parties and their counsel, whose role during these stages is limited to assisting the court.66
That said, the judge’s role in determining the case is limited to finding the
relevant law and applying it to the specific case before her. Judges do not have
the authority to turn to other legal sources, except for some support from academic writing.67 In the same manner, the judge cannot rely on precedent and
must focus on the instant case while searching for the solution in existing statutes, under the assumption that any existing legal situation ultimately has one
possible legal solution.68 In order for the judge to be able to apply the law to
any possible case, there is a need for clear and very detailed legislation, which
does not leave room for any doubt regarding which is the relevant law. Detailed and complicated legal codes are intended to make redundant the need
to interpret the law. The legal code is built from the abstract to the concrete,
in complete contrast to the casuistry that is typical to common law systems.69
63

ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 34–35.
Chase & Varano, supra note 60, at 220–24; MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra
note 2, at 30, 33–35.
65 As opposed to the adversarial judge, who will not summon a witness on her own
initiative even if she believes that he is a key witness and will even restrain herself from
interfering in the interrogation of the witnesses. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 307.
66 ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 165–66.
67 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 24–25, 35–36.
68 Id. at 23.
69 See id. at 39–47. The clear difference between the foundations of legislation of the
different traditions was reflected in the academic discussion held in countries that apply
the Sharia system, in which the laws are divided into five different categories, including a
category of laws that can be applied but not required. Violation of this category, being only
a recommendation, does not entail a sanction. In this tradition, there is a great resemblance
to the continental system with respect to the existing hierarchy between the types of legislation (such as constitution versus ordinary legislation). NECHEMYA LE-BEN-ZION ET AL., 2
HAISLAM: MAVO LEHISTORIA SHEL HADAT [ISLAM: INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF
RELIGION] 11–13 (1998). But unlike this tradition, it is not made up of general and comprehensive legislation, with the proposal for a complete codification being rejected. Id. at
64
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The sources of continental law are heterogeneous and originate from different historical periods.70 The existing differences between legal systems in
various countries are also a result of the development of national legal systems
in each of the central European countries that act under this legal tradition.
Despite the differences, the origin of legal principles in these countries typified by shared principles are in the tradition of the Code civil.71 As opposed
to the custom in common law, the rulings of continental judges are not considered laws, which can only be created by the legislative branch.72 Judges are
required to rely only on written law in their rulings, and not on the work of
scholars or precedent. The perception is that the code provides a solution to
any legal problem without leaving room for judicial discretion. Even in the
case of a lacuna in the law, there are still clear guidelines as to how the judge
must proceed in accordance with the concrete case.73
The status of the judge in the continental tradition varies between different
countries and, therefore, so does the perception of the role of judges. In some
countries, judges are perceived as clerks, and their status is equal to that of
other public servants. In others, one can choose the path to become a judge as
one of the career options that are offered to graduates of a law degree.74 In
some places, a law graduate can take a test that would authorize him or her to
become a judge—even without any legal experience or seniority.75 This is an
interesting approach, given the significance of the dispute resolver’s experience and reputation when establishing authority in the eyes of the parties involved. The clerical perception of the inquisitorial judges harms their ability
to demonstrate experience and skill beyond their judicial role, crucial elements in guiding parties towards settlement, while using dispute resolution
practices.
Within the inquisitorial tradition, rules of procedure are strict and are managed mostly by the judge.76 The trial at first instance, where the factual basis
of the case is determined, is managed as a series of performances before the
judge, without any clear distinction between the preliminary and evidentiary
22–23. Rather, this system is characterized by a legislative fabric in which there are lacunas
and gaps, required for disruption and judicial supplementation Id. at 14.
70 For further details on the development of the continental tradition, see M ERRYMAN
& PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 6–38.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 36–38.
73 Id. at 20–27, 34–39.
74 This is in contrast to electing a judge from a line of experienced lawyers or esteemed
scholars in common law countries. Chase & Varano, supra note 60, at 215, 217;
MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 33–35.
75 MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 2, at 35. In France, for example, the
appointment of a judge is conditional on studies at a special judges’ school after completing
a law degree. Id.
76 See Chase & Varano, supra note 60, at 220–26; LEVIN, supra note 60, at 121–33.
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stages. The discovery is very basic and limited, led by the principle that no
party should be required to assist the other party in the investigation of facts.
The status of written evidence is stronger than that of oral testimony; investigation of witnesses is conducted mostly by judges, without cross-examination
by lawyers; and the choice of witnesses is also made by the judge. The authority given to the professional judge to take active measures along the way
is, therefore, far more substantial than that afforded to the adversarial judge.
The inquisitorial process is characterized by protocols based on written
requests. This replaces oral argument, which is prevalent in the adversarial
process, and allows the judge to directly converse with the parties. The inquisitorial judge, however, rarely sees the parties. Thus, her ability to develop an
alternative type of discourse during preliminary procedures is limited. This
typical lack of direct interaction with the litigants during preliminary stages
of litigation, and in general, is yet another obstacle to the ability of the inquisitorial judge to resolve the case at hand.77
Thus, at first glance, it seems that the common and continental traditions
are mutually exclusive. However, this assumption of dichotomy between
these two seemingly distinct traditions is nowadays debatable. In the following section, this Article will examine a hybridization process we identify today in numerous legal systems worldwide, specifically, the integration of inquisitorial apparatuses within adversarial mechanisms.
III. THE INTEGRATION OF INQUISITORIAL TOOLS WITHIN THE REALM OF
DISCRETION OF THE ADVERSARIAL JUDGE—HYBRIDIZATION
The traditional perceived dichotomy between the adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions no longer exists as such. Today, legal systems in each
country combine—in different degrees and manners—elements of the common law and adversarial procedures with elements taken from inquisitorial
judging and codification.78 This hybridization has become a central characteristic of legal systems and provides various foundations for conflict-resolution
processes led by judges, whether on their own initiative or as part of an organizational, institutional structuring that reflects the goals of each court

77

Loïc Cadiet, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and Delay. The French Perspective,
in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 32, at 29, § 3.4 at 300 (referring to the law that is
applied in France, Cadiet finds that while this system is characterized by the ability to argue
orally and publicly, in practice, most courts suffice with written arguments and judges tend
to downplay the value of the oral argument to the point of making it a rare practice).
78 See Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 281, 288; Menachem Mautner, Codex shel Hamishpat Hamekubal [A Common Law Code], 36 MISHPATIM 199 (2006) (Isr.); LEVIN, supra note
60, at 121–33.
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system.79 This combination of characteristics from both systems, which developed in a patchwork way, was created to achieve efficiency as well as other
institutional goals, as ADR processes have been implemented into the different courts. Some of these procedures have been developed bottom-up, at times
accompanied by legislation and legal reforms enacted top-down, with little
conceptualization and theorization of these developments.80
Indeed, in examining adversarial legal systems, we are not dealing with a
unified model. While civil litigation in the U.K. is extremely expensive,81 the
American court system is more open and diverse. The American system is
accessible to broader parts of the public. Yet, American litigation is also expensive and cumbersome due to its extensive discovery requirements.82 Similarly, there are distinct differences between the different legal systems found
in civil law countries.83 Yet, despite the clear structural and ideological differences between the two traditions, over the past few decades in countries
representing both traditions, there has been an ongoing process of studying
and applying norms and techniques typical of the other system. This implementation has been conducted partly through “legal transplants,”84 and partly
79 Thus, for example, the imposition of a financial sanction on a party who refuses a
settlement proposal during the proceeding, where the result in the judgment is worse than
the proposal he received. This system, used in the United States, England, and Ireland encourages the parties to negotiate with each other in such a way that the proposing party
actually buys a kind of “insurance policy” in case his proposal, which was not accepted, is
higher than the judicial proposal. In such a case, the refusing party will be fined since his
refusal resulted in the conduct of an entire legal proceeding without lessening the system’s
workload. See Pablo Cortés, A Comparative Review of Offers to Settle—Would an Emerging Settlement Culture Pave the Way for their Adoption in Continental Europe?, 32 CIV.
JUST. Q. 42, 43–47 (2012). This practice makes the court an active participant, even if not
a direct one, in the conduct of reaching a settlement, and the judge herself holds the sword
of the financial sanction in view of the judicial outcome and the mediation proposal with
respect thereto, id. at 45. The same applies to Israel, where §§ 504–10, Old Civil Procedure
Regulations, supra note 17, allow a judge to impose costs in cases such as these. The New
Civil Procedure Regulations cancelled these regulations and therefore impair the ability of
the active judge to use the tool of imposing costs in order to promote a settlement. See Alon
Klement, Reforma Behotsaot Mishpat Bahalich Haerzrahi – Mitve Lediun [Reform of Trial
Costs in Civil Procedure – An Outline for Discussion], 9 MISHPATIM AL ATAR 107, 139–
40 (2016) (Isr.).
80 See, e.g., WOOLF, supra note 33, at 272–81. See also Resnik, supra note 7.
81 ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE
773–74 (3d ed. 2013).
82 See Kotz, supra note 50; Lee, supra note 33.
83 Chase & Varano, supra note 60, at 215, 217; MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra
note 2, at 33–35. See generally CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 32 (examining practices
of each of the countries that operate under this tradition and characterizing the differences
between them).
84 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21–30
(2d ed. 1993).
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through gradual processes of adaptation and merging. This implementation is
linked to the critique concerning the pitfalls typical to each tradition, and conversely, the advantages inherent to the other tradition.85
This process originated at the end of the nineteenth century with the development of comparative study of the procedures and conflict-resolution
mechanisms of each system.86 For example, continental countries began to
establish constitutional courts with the goal of confining the power of the legislature while expanding the power of judges. They did so by granting the
judicial branch authority and wide discretion to declare a law unconstitutional
and subsequently invalidate it.87
Another example is the establishment of supranational bodies in Europe,
such as the European Union, which created norms and rules that subjugated
the rules of all countries that belong to it.88 This created multiplicity of legal
systems in the same country, similar to the situation in common law countries.89 Moreover, continental judges began to rely on legal precedent, such as
the decision that the rulings of the Constitutional Court in Germany bind other
German courts.90
Simultaneously, throughout the twentieth century, a critical discourse began to develop concerning the efficiency of the adversarial system and the role
of judges within it.91 While changes to the Code civil systems have always
85 One of the methods of assimilation is to hold conferences and joint learning sessions
of judges from the various legal systems, which focus on dialogues that deal with judicial
settlement as a cross-border practice. Thus, for example, the European Council hosted the
1st European Conference of Judges in 2003, which dealt with possibilities available to the
judge to assist the parties in reaching an early settlement of the dispute. In addition to
judges from European Council member states, judges from the United States, Canada, and
other countries took part. 1st Eur. Conf. of Judges, The Early Settlement of Disputes and
the Role of Judges (June 2005).
86 Chase & Varano, supra note 60, at 215, 217; MERRYMAN & PEREZ-PERDOMO, supra
note 2, at 33–35.
87 GLENDON ET AL., supra note 55, at 88–120.
88 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47. European institutions can create directives, regulations,
decisions, opinions and recommendations, where the regulations are a matter of legislation,
with a general and direct applicability to any member State. Id. at arts. 288–89. Also, the
principle of subsidiarity allows the Union to enact a law in cases where a particular goal is
not properly achieved by the member States. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13.
89 Thus, in several countries in Europe, domestic and EU law will apply. Dana Burchardt, The Relationship Between the Law of the European Union and the Law of its Member States - A Norm-Based Conceptual Framework, 15 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 73, 83–84,
87–88, 93 n.63, 97–98 (2019).
90 GLENDON ET AL., supra note 55, at 106; John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1997) (book review).
91 Chase & Varano, supra note 60, at 220–26; Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 286; DÉIRDRE
DWYER, THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON 1–3 (2009).
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been dramatic and characterized by codification produced “out of thin air,”
the common law traditionally evolved around small and gradual changes
rooted in the existing structure.92 Eventually, and unlike the gradual and linear
way in which the principles of common law had originally developed, swift
and radical changes began to emerge in flagship countries of the common law
tradition, such as England, which have essentially changed the nature of their
legal systems. For example, in 1998 with the enactment of the Human Rights
Act, British law was subordinated to the European Convention on Human
Rights, which represented an internal change that originated in external
norms.93 In addition, the broad social legislation enacted by the English parliament in the nineteenth century bypassed the method of gradual creation of
social laws by judges and their rulings. The parliament in effect created legislation anew, similar to the processes of the continental tradition.94
The ideological basis of the English legal system underwent dramatic
changes with the adoption of the Lord Woolf reform, which transformed the
conceptual center of gravity of the system: from justice on the merits at all
costs to the inquisitorial ideal of access to justice.95 This meant, among other
implications, that cost became a central consideration in deciding whether or
not to litigate a case.96 The understanding that cost was a central barrier to the
ability to end disputes through traditional litigation (culminating in a court
ruling) led to an institutional directive to search for alternative procedures for
dispute resolution.97 This conceptual change has had significant organizational and procedural influence on all levels of the English legal system.98 The
Lord Briggs reform diverted the principal stage of litigation to the preliminary
phase.99 Among other means, parliament achieved this reform by introducing

92 Allan C. Hutchinson, Making Progress? Change and the Common Law, 4
HIBERNIAN L.J. 25, 28, 37–38 (2003).
93 See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, § 3(1) (UK) (“So far as it is possible to do so,
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way
which is compatible with the Convention rights.”).
94 GLENDON ET AL., supra note 55, at 316.
95 See Paul Michalik, Justice in Crisis: England and Wales, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS,
supra note 32, §§ 4.2–4.3, at 152–58.
96 See WOOLF, supra note 33, at 78.
97 See discussion and sources cited supra note 33; Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note
23, at 303–04.
98 See Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 289; Gregory W. O’Reilly, England Limits the Right
to Silence and Moves Towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 402, 451 (1994) (dealing with the restriction of the defendant’s right to silence in criminal law and attributing changes in the law to the application and acceptance
of inquisitorial elements).
99 LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, CIVIL COURTS STRUCTURE REVIEW: FINAL REPORT (2016),
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/civil-courts-structure-review-finalreport-jul-16-final-1.pdf.
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a computerized system and case managers whose role is to deem the actual
opening of the case redundant.
Galanter argues that throughout the second half of the 20th century, the
American legal system underwent an institutional shift which conferred
broader discretion on trial court judges, especially at pretrial proceedings.100
This implementation of continental and inquisitorial practices and procedural
rules within the American legal system has directly contributed to the reduction of the number of trials, as many lawsuits are decided without evidentiary
hearings and based only on written pleadings and evidence submitted to the
court.101
The paradigmatic shift—the move from classic adversarial procedure to
one that incorporates inquisitorial elements—required procedural reforms,
mainly in the manner of affording powers once held by the parties alone to
the judge, who had become significantly more involved in the management of
litigation. This reform was made possible through specific rules that allowed
the judge to manage the process, set timeframes, and act of her own initiative
without having to rely on the parties’ requests.102 In Israel, where most lawsuits end in settlement (or other ways not through judgment),103 the combination of common law with the reliance on detailed codes, especially in civil
cases, was declared from the outset as inherent to its hybrid nature as a
(young) legal system that draws from both traditions.104 The origins of the
100

Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May
Mean, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 5 (2004).
101 Id.
102 ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 97; §§ 143–47, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17 (regulating the powers of the judge in pretrial proceedings).
103 See Weinshall-Margel et al., supra note 25, at 768; Sela et al., supra note 8, at 90–
92; Ayelet Sela & Limor Gabay-Egozi, Vanishing Trials, Settlement Judges? Data on
Judges’ Procedural Involvement Shed Light on Their Role in Civil Litigation 3 (July 25,
2018) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Israeli Law and Society
Association) (on file with authors). See generally 1st Eur. Conf. of Judges, supra note 85.
104 See Mautner, supra note 78; Aharon Barak, Shitat Hamishpat Beisrael – Masorta
Vetarbuta [The Legal System in Israel – Its Tradition and Culture], 40 HAPRAKLIT 197
(1992) (Isr.); Aharon Barak, Mavo Lehatsa'at Hacodex Haezrachi Haisraeli [Introduction
Israeli Draft Civil Code], 36 MISHPATIM 1 (2006) (Isr.). Following the replacement of the
Mecelle, Israeli law was based on existing legislation and case law, on the rules of Mishpat
Ivri, as well as on comparative law and its Anglo-American and Continental sources. Thus,
while the prominent part of civil law was formulated in the Supreme Court rulings, the
code, borrowed from civil law, completed gaps found therein. See Mautner, supra note 78,
at 210. Mautner reviews three influential codes, including the French Code Civil, in the
context of which he notes that despite it being detailed and accessible in its language, the
courts in France deal with the creation of a law in a manner identical to the method of
action of judges in England and the United States. It is possible that the reason why the
code manages to function successfully despite the many societal changes in the centuries
since its enactment, is the contribution of the courts to its completion and updating it with
new contents. Mautner, supra note 78, at 210–13.
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Israeli legal tradition (including the influence of Jewish law) draw upon the
common law and clear inquisitorial elements.105 Thus, while most of Israeli
law was formed via rulings of the Supreme Court, this was complemented by
the codex borrowed from continental law as needed. When examining Israeli
rules of civil procedure, the process of pleadings, for example, builds on inquisitorial traditions.106 Similarly, the rule determines that a party cannot raise
alternative factual claims without the use of an affidavit.107 In addition, the
rules of procedure in family court, which require filing an affidavit to substantiate facts that are mentioned in pleadings, attempt to limit the kind of arguments parties can make while focusing on claims that appear to be the ones
that can be proven.108 It seems that these procedural mechanisms were meant
to minimize the preliminary gaps that characterize adversarial pleadings by
shedding light on the real disagreements—and on real disagreements only—
from the outset. This is a significant departure from a tradition that made it
possible, for the sake of establishing a preliminary rights discourse, to extend
the dispute between the parties well beyond their actual interests. The incorporation of focused and purposeful rules of civil procedure has limited the
extent of disagreement that comes before the judge from the start. This enables
the judge to decide upon the actual discrepancies between the parties while
focusing her efforts on leading them to settle the case, taking into consideration the wider web of their interests.109
This Article will next examine the hybridization of legal traditions in general and, in particular, the assimilation of tools that are typical to the inquisitorial tradition within adversarial systems. Delineating new patterns that have
emerged will facilitate the actual application of unique ADR procedures
within the courtroom.

105

Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Doron Dorfman, Shimush Lera'a Vechoser Tom-Lev Bahalich Haezrachi: Hapa'ar Shebein Model Diuni Post Adversary Lemodel Yetsug Masorati
[Abuse and Bad Faith in the Civil Procedure: The Gap Between a Post-Adversarial Procedural Model and a Traditional Representation Model], in THE BOOK OF SHLOMO LEVIN
255, 264–65 (2013). Former Justice Levin determines that there are currently no more pure
models according to one of the above systems. See LEVIN, supra note 60, at 121. The New
Civil Procedure Regulations create a perception of an inquisitorial judge who conducts the
judicial proceeding proactively. See Gal, supra note 34, at 2.
106 Tit. A, §§ 240–46, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
107 Id. § 72(b).
108 Id. § 258(H). This is similar to the requirement to file an affidavit in summary civil
claims. Id. §§ 214(C), 79.
109 See Gal, supra note 34, at 2.
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IV. CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
A. From the Inside Out and Back Again
Dispute-resolution procedures offered by the ADR movement were developed outside of the legal system in response to the limitations and disadvantages of the adversarial system. The question is: do these procedures maintain their advantages when implemented back into traditional courtroom
settings?110 In this section, this Article presents the development of a new
sphere of judicial activity as part of the evolution of current mediation practices—from an alternative to adjudication to a hybrid process that combines
authority with persuasion, one that is parallel to the contemporary judicial activity of reaching agreements within the courtroom.111
The institutional need to shift legal disputes to external dispute-resolution
forums emerged from the significant caseload in legal systems, which caused
significant delays in the time needed for cases to be resolved as well as the
high costs involved in managing full litigation.112 These factors led to two
constitutive events that shaped the conflict-resolution ideology in common
law countries. The first was the Pound Conference, convened in Minnesota in
1976, where leading American legal scholars gathered to express their disappointment in the administration of justice in the legal system of the time. 113
The second was the publication of Fisher and Ury's book Getting to Yes in
1981.114 The book offered a new perspective on how conflicts are handled,
suggesting an alternative way of thinking about conflicts and their resolution.115 In other words, the search for alternatives outside of the formal legal
110

Some believe that the ability of the judge to mediate in the courtroom is limited and
is mainly based on his skill in assessing the legal risk inherent for each party in the case.
The judge, according to this theory, is not sufficiently skilled and lacks the appropriate
tools to develop a broader discourse of interests, and as a result, the outcome achieved in
this type of mediation does not end the wide-ranging dispute between the parties, but only
the dispute before the court. Mironi, supra note 14, at 499; Elad Finkelstein, Hafrata
Veregulatsia: Hahasdara Hamishpatit shel Halich Hagishur [Privatization and Regulation: The Legal Regime Governing Mediation], 30 IYUNEI MISHPAT 623, 650 (2008) (Isr.);
Joyce Low & Dorcas Quek, An Overview of Court Mediation in the State Courts of Singapore, in MEDIATION IN SINGAPORE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 203, 240–41 (2015).
111 For a description of this move from the perspective of the development of models
of mediation and for a detailed presentation of the hybrid model of authority-based mediation, see Amos Gabrieli et al., Authority-Based Mediation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1 (2018).
112 See Gal, supra note 34; Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 303–04.
113 J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Reform and the Pound Conference of 1976, 80 MICH.
L. REV. 592 (1982).
114 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
115 Id. at 10–14; ALBERSTEIN, THEORY OF MEDIATION, supra note 35, at 170–71, 238.
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system was driven by the system's failures and reservations felt by both litigants and experts within the system towards the adversarial tradition in various countries.116
Given these two key events, one could argue that the reason behind the
development of conflict-resolution procedures within adversarial systems was
not inefficiency, as perceived during the Pound Conference, since ADR is not
necessarily a more efficient mechanism for dispute resolution. Rather, mediation was perhaps promoted and adopted as a procedure that provides the opportunity—according to its founders, and in the spirit of Fisher and Ury—to
reach a wholesome, complete, broader, and more just solution to disputes.117
The preference of dispute-resolution procedures over adversarial litigation
stems partially, therefore, from the recognition of the system itself that it
should not only serve merely as an indifferent technical mechanism for determining cases; instead, the legal system can aspire to provide a holistic and
broad approach to the resolution of disputes, not limited to the narrow context
at hand.118
The coupling of pragmatic mediation as a holistic alternative and the adversarial system could be understood based on the claim that the adversarial
procedure was designed in the first place for the purpose of dispute resolution
and not driven by the search for truth.119 According to this view, the adversarial system is, apparently, friendlier and more suitable for the assimilation of
dispute-resolution processes, both within and outside the courtroom. This is
because a legal procedure whose purpose is not the achievement of justice or
compatibility between factual and legal truths is more suitable for the parties
to reach an agreement.120 Mediation, it would appear, offers a better solution
Cortés, supra note 79, at 42. Cortés’s point of departure is that the combination of
high legal costs and an evolving culture of judicial mediation was formed mainly in the
common law countries, where these two components were fundamental tiers of the method
itself: “In common law jurisdictions settlement is perceived to be the best possible outcome
of a dispute, where the recourse to the civil courts often represents not only a more costly
and time-consuming option, but also ‘the failure of a social, commercial or public relations
and mechanisms.’” Id.
117 See Michal Alberstein, Tsedek Mair Mol Tsedel Nisgav: Anatomia Shel Iachasei
Praktika Vetheoryia Beyeshuv Sichsuchim [Swift Justice Versus Sublime Justice: Anatomy
of Practice and Theory Relations in Dispute Resolution], 9 ALEY MISHPAT 85 (2011) (Isr.);
Alberstein, THE THEORY OF MEDIATION, supra note 35, at 25–38.
118 Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 286.
119 Id. at 288.
120 Mordechai Kremnitzer, Hatamat Hahalich Haplili Lematara shel Gilui Haemet o
Haim Lo Hegia Haet Lesaiem et Onat Hamischakim [Adapting the Criminal Procedure to
the Purpose of Discovering the Truth, or Is It Not Time to End the Games Season], 17
MISHPATIM 475, 477–78 (1988) (Isr.) (“The distinguishing feature of the system known as
'inquisitorial' is the duty to investigate, which is imposed on the judge. The court investigates, by virtue of its role, the factual data, in the words of Section 244.2 of the German
Code of Criminal Procedure – the truth (without quotation marks).”).
116
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for conflict resolution, with the added value of providing a broader framework
relating to conflicts.
Yet, despite the apparent compatibility between adversarial conflict resolution and its extra-legal alternatives, the nature of oppositional litigation,
which is traditionally managed by the parties and their attorneys while relying
upon tendentious pleading revealing only partial truths,121 clearly offers little
ground for open and peaceful discourse between the parties. The pleadings,
which frame any legal conflict from the outset, routinely initially reflect unlimited aspirations of the parties, which present to the court unrelenting positions that do not include or reflect any interests that cannot be directly translated into legal arguments or remedy. The parties have maintained language,
even in the era of ADR, that is oppositional, defying, lacking any acceptance
of the other side’s claims, and which relies on rights discourse only. This climate poses an inherent challenge to the introduction of a cooperative discourse between the parties themselves, one that incorporates the examination
of broad interests, and even extra-legal ones.
The nature of pleadings within the adversarial tradition is a result of an
ongoing legal culture within which the attorney envisions the most effective
way to persuade the judge to rule in their client’s favor, regardless of how the
facts were presented to them, and mainly based on the impact of the presentation on the other party.122 This contributes to deepening and escalating the
conflict between the parties, since pleadings are perceived as a rhetorical tool
in the exchange between the lawyers and the judge, rather than as a means of
communication through which the parties may reach an understanding.123
Even when the pleadings are, allegedly, based on empirical and proportional presentation of the claims, such as when an expert opinion that is meant
to bring before the court scientific or other professional truth is presented, they
are still contaminated by a subjective narrative and a confrontational nature.
Appointed experts tend to overlook scientific possibilities and probabilities
that do not keep with the position of the party who enlisted their services,

121

Pinchas Goldstein & Moshe Burnovsky, Hibatim Eyonieim Shel Kedam Misphat
[Some Aspects of the Pre-Trial Conference (“Kedam Mishpat”) in Israel], 4 IYUNEI
MISHPAT 312, 322 n.36 (1975) (Isr.).
122 ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 97.
123 Perlman, supra note 14, at 371–72 (“The adversarial system, fosters unnecessary
strife, radicalizes positions and creates arguments that do not focus on achieving an effective solution to the dispute. The adversarial proceeding makes legal representation belligerent in its nature, and leads to threats, concealment of important information and a presentation of a partial and erroneous picture of the dispute, which does not take into account a
complex human reality. It is argued that the adversarial conduct harms the psychological
well-being of all parties to the dispute and that the adversarial practice handles the problem
on a narrow level and provides a forced solution which is often merely ad hoc and superficial.”).
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while highlighting less likely or negligible possibilities in the interest of the
party they serve.124
This state of affairs illustrates how the failure of the adversarial system to
create and encourage narrow or broad conciliative discourse between the parties has continued to overshadow the possibility of forming meaningful mediation procedures under the auspices of the court.125 Sander, as a founder of the
ADR movement, originally envisioned transforming courts into dispute-resolution centers, where parties would arrive to tell their stories prior to submitting their pleadings.126 According to his approach, first would come a functional sorting procedure, where the parties’ goals and the pitfalls
characterizing their dispute would be identified. Then, the procedure would
be tailored to the needs the parties present and the barriers preventing them
from reaching an agreement on their own. According to Sander, only in rare
cases where adjudication is indeed selected as the appropriate avenue would
the parties submit their pleading and continue to traditional litigation.127 Adjudication, it follows, would be a rare occurrence. This vision was never realized. The court system supported the evolution of alternative procedures on
the one hand, while, on the other hand, maintaining the adversarial nature of
the court and positioning mediation as less worthy than litigation. Today’s
mediation, conducted alongside legal procedures, is mainly characterized by
an authoritative approach focusing on resolution in a narrow sense.128
It can be argued that the promise of the ADR movement eventually led to
alternatives that are closer to traditional adjudication than what its founders
had envisioned. The development of meaningful mediational discourse alongside the legal system has been met with limited success.129 The ideology of
mediation has managed to permeate the courtroom only to a very limited degree. The adversarial system, which could have largely benefitted from a
ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 162 (“It is universally known that in the adversarial
system, experts are ‘hired guns’ . . . reality shows that in exchange for the appropriate fee,
there will be found an expert who is willing to say anything. Paradoxically, in the current
situation, the more impartial and objective the expert the less likely he is to be hired by the
litigant.”).
125 The typical narrative is that a pleading aims to persuade the deciding third party,
whereas the narrative of a party to an alternative dispute resolution proceeding is attempting to persuade the opposing party.
126 See Frank E. A. Sander, The Multi-Door Courthouse: Settling Dispute in the Year
2000, 3 BARRISTER 18, 20 (1976). See also Sander & Rozdeiczer, supra note 35.
127 Sander & Rozdeiczer, supra note 35, at 23.
128 See Michal Alberstein, Al Hachipazon Vehatsedek Haprotsedurali Bebeit Hadin
Leavoda: Tatzpiot Begishur Veshfita [Of Haste and Procedural Justice in the Labor Court:
Observations of Mediation and Adjudication], 7 MOZNEI MISHPAT 119, 137 (2010) (Isr.);
Gabrieli et al., supra note 111, at 5–8.
129 KARNI PERLMAN, YISHUV SICHSUCHIM – MISHPAT SHITUFI VETIPULI [CONFLICT
RESOLUTION – APPLYING NON-ADVERSARIAL AND THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE] 145, 165 (2015)
(Isr.); Gabrieli et al., supra note 111, at 9.
124
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wider dispute resolution perspective, has developed tools suitable for the existing competitive arena in order to promote agreement and cooperation while
still maintaining its traditional characteristics. These tools have given rise to
common practices of bringing about agreement driven by judicial authority.130
Widespread dispute resolution practice incorporated within an adversarial
legal system is more effective when there is a legislative and organizational
foundation that accords with this philosophy, where clear inquisitorial-like
tools have been incorporated into the legal system. These tools differ from
those used in mediation and should be closely examined, yet their incorporation within the formal legal system contributes to the mediational discourse
and increases the chances of ending cases in settlement. The value of such
tools is in adding elements of truth-seeking and judicial activism to a system
that has traditionally focused on narrow dispute resolution overborne by a
passive judge. Contextualizing such tools in a worldview of dispute resolution
enriches judicial activity, forming a liminal space between mediation and adjudication.
Our claim is that the manner in which the adversarial judge perceives her
own role and authority,131 combined with inquisitorial influences as described
above, creates a new dynamic relative to that found in the traditional adversarial stance. The change in judges’ self-perception132 and the exposure to
other forms of dialogue—dialogues that put the person, and not the dispute,
at the center, and that involve interests and feelings, not only rights—in effect
also transform the way in which the parties and their attorneys perceive the
role of the judge.
This hybridization allows for the application of techniques typical to dispute-resolution procedures within the adversarial legal system and reflects its
readiness for the inclusion of such procedures as a result of (but not limited
to) the changing role of the judge.133 This assimilation relies on two
130

Alberstein, supra note 8.
For example, the judicial mediation practiced by all of Singapore’s judicial instances, where the mediating judge follows specific regulations, but will under no circumstances will be involved in any subsequent trial processes. Mediation, SINGAPORE COURTS:
THE JUDICIARY (Aug. 3, 2022) (Sing.), https://www.judiciary.gov.sg/alternatives-totrial/mediation/going-for-mediation-state-courts; Jean-François Roberge & Dorcas Quek
Anderson, Judicial Mediation: From Debates to Renewal, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 613, 618 (2018).
132 With respect to the development of the perception of the traditional role of the federal judge in the United States and expansion of the permissible toolkit that may be used,
see Judith Resnik, Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice: Inventing the Federal District
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J.
607, 651–55 (2002).
133 On the extent to which intervention by the adversarial judge in the proceeding over
which he presides has changed from passive to active, see id. at 654 (“Federal judicial
hierarchy is pushing a campaign to make its trial judges abandon their traditional role as
131

116

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

[Vol. 51:1

foundations. The first is the ideological and organizational cooperation between the legal system and external dispute-resolution facilitators (in particular, mediators). This cooperation allows judges, according to the rules of procedure and additional legislation concerning judicial discretion, to work with
the facilitators and even to impose sanctions on a party that does not cooperate
with mediation. This cooperation also allows judges to approve, later on in
the process, external settlements that are brought before the court. The second
foundation examined in this paper comprises activities performed by judges
within the courtroom, aimed at settling the case by means other than judicial
ruling.
The preliminary stage, through which judges familiarize themselves as
spectators of varying dispute-resolution techniques employed in settlements
reached by external professionals and brought before them, may serve as a
basis for the familiarity required for the second stage. At this stage, judges act
on their own, according to their individual capabilities, in applying these very
same techniques within the courtroom.134 The significant exposure of both
lawyers and judges to various dispute-resolution practices, including through
training, promotes the formation of the expertise and openness needed for the
educated use of such techniques during legal procedures within the courtroom.
How then have models of negotiation bearing mediational characteristics,
which were designed to bring parties to reach an agreement, come to be within
the adversarial courtroom in practice? To answer this question, this Article
will turn to examine preeminent common law systems in three different countries: the United States, Israel, and England. Each legal system allows us to
analyze the introduction of inquisitorial tools to adversarial courts from different vantage points, each shedding light on different aspects and possibilities
this phenomenon bears with it. This Article will start its examination by looking closely at mediational characteristics within American courtrooms, and
the way they were shaped by rules of procedure. After that, this Article will
continue with a comparison of the American and Israeli systems, tracking recent major developments of the Israeli rules of civil procedure. Finally, this
Article will finish with the country which was the birthplace of the common
law system—England—and will see what changes this allegedly-rigid system
underwent through the years in the direction of conflict-resolution tools within
the court.

passive umpires between opposing lawyers and to become more masterful in controlling
trials.”).
134 Dispute resolution proceedings have transformed from external procedures, which
neither address nor incorporate legal considerations, into an integral part of the judicial
process. See id. at 655 & n.211.
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B. The New Judicial Sphere in the American Legal System
The American legal system was a pioneer in assimilating inquisitorial
techniques, following years of developing the practice of external, alternative
dispute-resolution procedures.135 Alongside the ongoing public debate regarding the identity of judges, how they are appointed, and for how long, the discourse broadened to include questions concerning the changing role of federal
judges and how the judges themselves perceive their role. Subsequently, the
perceptions of litigants themselves began to change, including their degree of
tolerance towards the evolving scope of judges’ powers136: first, with the setting of discovery and conflict-resolution procedures that were managed by
pretrial examiners who are not judges; continuing with the appointment of
magistrates whose task is to absolve judges of the need to deal with extrajudicial matters so that they can focus on issuing judgments; and finally, with
the regulation of new rules, gradually introduced from the 1950s on, that allowed judges to carry out these same actions on their own.137
Subsequently, the settlement conference procedure evolved to where the
judge initiates the conference but does not herself serve as mediator. Rather,
a few days prior to the beginning of trial, the parties must attend a settlement
discussion. The judge is authorized to compel the parties to be present and to
bring any litigant who is authorized to make a decision concerning settlement
on site.138 A party who failed to bring the authorized individual was subject to
sanctions bearing significant costs.139 Eventually, various states began instilling mandatory mediation within courts, either initiated by the judge or mandated by the court system,140 within the framework of relevant legislation.
The reform in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,141 which were assimilated within the legislation of dozens of states,142 significantly broadened the
ability of American judges to intervene in the preliminary stages of

135 For more on the history of the development of ADR in the United States, see Holly
A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 367,
369–71 (2001).
136 Resnik, supra note 132, at 651–55.
137 Id. at 649–51. The change began in the 1950s, and the first cases in which such
procedures were implemented concerned bodily harm. See Resnik, supra note 14.
138 Elliot G. Hicks, Too Much of a Good Thing?, 12 W. VA. LAW. 4 (1998).
139 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 650–53 (7th Cir.
1989).
140 See, e.g., Chris Stirewalt, Mediators Help Many Find Middle Ground, CHARLESTON
DAILY MAIL, June 1, 1999, at 1C (describing the situation in West Virginia, where in 1986
a Federal Judge initiated a unique mediation program, which only a decade later was formalized as a mandatory mediation procedure in the entire State).
141 For a discussion on the reform, see Yeazell, supra note 23.
142 John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986).
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litigation.143 Accordingly, they created a convenient platform for ending litigation either through settlement or withdrawal at the early stages of the legal
process.144 Judicial decisions given during preliminary procedures helped parties reevaluate their desire to reach a settlement and allowed them, at a relatively early stage, to predict the possible outcome of the case. By doing so,
the new rules of civil procedure have transformed litigation from a search for
truth to an efficient and exhaustive investigation of legal procedure. Discovery, which was elaborated under the new rules, made way for judicial intervention in cases where the parties failed to reach an agreement,145 and these
judicial interventions incentivized parties to either reach a settlement or withdraw their lawsuit.146 Judges in lower courts enjoyed almost full immunity
from any critique by appellate courts concerning their discovery decisions.147
A document revealed following a judicial decision at an early stage of the
process could lead a party who recognizes that the other party holds significant evidence to reach a compromise, relinquish some of their arguments, or
even withdraw the lawsuit altogether. This is the kind of legal prediction that
encourages parties to reach a settlement.
Another change introduced in the new rules, which provided a clearly inquisitorial tool, was the option to bring into the case any party that is perceived
as relevant to the legal process. The only requirement is that this new party
must be related by a common question of fact or law.148 This differs from the
previous situation in the American adversarial system where the joinder of
parties or claims was allowed only in very limited situations.149 For example,
joinder of parties is now allowed when the new party is related to an action or
an event that is the subject of a lawsuit.150 Rule 19 allows adding or removing
parties under certain circumstances,151 and Rule 23 elaborates the definition
of instances where it is possible to join a class action.152 There is evidence
showing that enlarging the ability to join parties and combine claims has incentivized parties to reach settlements or to withdraw lawsuits and has served
143

Yeazell, supra note 23, at 636, 637 n.18. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 404–05, 408

n.137.
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Yeazell, supra note 23, at 656–60.
version of the Code, a party seeking discovery of a document
was required to show “good cause therefor.” FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1968) (amended 1970).
The amendment omitted this requirement, and currently only relevance is required. FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
146 Yeazell, supra note 23, at 648–50.
147 Id. at 650–53. The appellate court will only intervene in rare circumstances, and
where the judge clearly exceeded the discretion vested in her on such matter. Id.
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
149 Yeazell, supra note 23, at 654.
150 FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14.
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
145 According to an earlier
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as a significant cause in reducing the number of cases ending without a judicial ruling.153
The American pretrial process affords judges the ability to consider any
method or avenue that may promote the progress of the case. The ground for
this is that judges are granted responsibilities that deviate from their traditional
role through the elaboration of judges’ discretion concerning the management
of the process.154 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (originally
called “Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues”), which initially vested discretion in judges to confer with lawyers on trial preparation, gradually became
what Resnik has referred to as “the centerpiece of judicial management of
both lawyers and of cases, and the aim is avowedly to promote settlement
without trial.”155 This could be demonstrated in the evolving interpretation
given to the Rule by different courts over the years. While in 1945, the Ninth
Circuit Court stated that “the purpose of the pre-trial conference is to simplify
the issues, amend the pleadings where necessary, and to avoid unnecessary
proof of facts at the trial;”156 by 2012, the District Court for D.C. interpreted
the Rule’s purpose as “to promote the ability of the Court to manage cases, to
develop ‘a sound plan to govern the particular case from start to finish.’”157
Within this framework, the judge may invite the parties’ attorneys to attend
an informal hearing to promote a settlement even before the formal procedure
actually begins.158 The regulation of this procedure through legislation has
granted it special status, so that a pretrial conference is now seen as an “integral part of procedure.”159 This special status stems from the position Rule 16
has acquired over the years, placing it at the heart of the legal procedure; with
the inquisitorial tools it provides regarded as a supplement, or even an alternative, to litigation.160 This is not an incidental attempt to bring parties to
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Yeazell, supra note 23, at 653–57.
Harry M. Fisher, Judicial Mediation: How it Works Through Pre-Trial Conference,
10 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 453 (1943).
155 Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 1793, 1803 (2014).
156 McDonald v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 741, 742–43 (1945).
157 Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. D.C., 286 F.R.D. 117, 129 (2012).
158 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
159 Fisher, supra note 154, at 453–54 (describing the success of Illinois’ implementation of mandatory pretrial conferences).
160 Resnik, supra note 155, at 1803–04; FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) advisory committee’s note
to 1983 amendment (“settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as
possible.”). Resnik notes that the federal judiciary website in 2014 emphasized the idea
that “[t]o avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage litigants to try to
reach an agreement resolving their dispute.” Resnik, supra note 155, at 1806 (quoting Civil
Cases, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/types-cases/civil-cases).
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settle, but rather an intentional procedure designed, among other objectives,
to make possible a different kind of discourse within the courtroom.161
The application of this rule has been expanded to other realms of adjudication, such as allowing judges to strike out a lawsuit when the parties refuse
to attend the preliminary hearing.162 The preliminary hearing is a highly inquisitorial-like procedure that grants judges vast authority of intervention,
which can foster a relaxed, informal environment that incorporates ADR tools
to create open and all-encompassing discourse. Such discourse is not limited
to what is written in the pleadings; it relates to interests and examines solutions outside of the remedies requested by the parties.163 This procedure allows the judge to reflect to the parties the different legal possibilities that are
open to them, to speak directly with the parties themselves, and to reach conclusions that do not necessarily follow from the legal deduction of the evidence that would be required within the realms of a judicial ruling. This

161

The Rule now encourages direct discourse. One of the latest amendments to Rule
16, in 2015, omitted the provision for consulting a conference by “telephone, mail, or other
means,” because a conference “is more effective if the court and parties engage in direct
simultaneous communication. The conference may be held in person, by telephone, or by
more sophisticated electronic means.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015
amendment.
162 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f)(1) (giving judges authority to impose sanction of dismissal
for failure to attend pretrial hearing). For more on the active and intervening judge in adversarial law countries, see OSCAR CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE
CONTEXT 254–56, 593–94 (Oscar Chase & Helen Hershkoff eds., 2007). There is no consistent position with respect to the identity of the mediating judge, and whereas some legal
systems allow the judge presiding over the case to conduct mediation proceedings, other
systems categorically prohibit this. In the United States, the amendment to Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect in 1983, established the judge’s power
at pretrial to promote a settlement between the parties to the case. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5).
See also Sela et al., supra note 8, at 13; Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement
Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 271, 272–73 (2011). At the pretrial stage in Israel, as noted above, the judge has
the power to promote a settlement between the parties. § 140, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17. Observations of pretrial hearings in Israel indicate that judges take
a variety of measures for the purpose of persuasion and intervention, which are intended to
lead the parties to settle the case. See Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 306; see
also sources cited supra note 14; Alberstein, supra note 6, at 47–50.
163 In Israeli law, the principle whereby the court will not award the plaintiff a remedy
that was not sought is not an absolute rule, and may be set aside in unusual cases where
three cumulative conditions are satisfied: where the need to clarify the substantive issues
in dispute warrants the issuance of the remedy, where the remedy concerned directly derives from the remedy sought, and where all of the evidence required in order to rule on
the remedy in question have been provided. See CivA 10576/06 Bezeq Benleomi Be’am
Neged Tadiran Be’am [Bezeq Int’l Ltd. v. Tadiran Ltd.], Nevo Legal Database (Aug. 12,
2009) (Isr.); CivA 8570/09 Haguli Neged Eiriat Rishon Lezion [Samira Haguli v. Mun. of
Rishon LeZion], Nevo Legal Database (Mar. 15, 2011) (Isr.).
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platform has provided a fertile ground for conflict-resolution procedures in
general, and specifically for mediation.164
Another example of the implementation of inquisitorial-like technique
within the American legal procedure is summary judgment;165 the court can
conduct an abbreviated procedure in civil cases where there is no factual disagreement and the court can reach an unequivocal ruling through application
of relevant law.166 That way, the judge can review the case and examine it
even before litigation has begun, as soon as the end of discovery procedures,
and when all relevant documents required for the understanding of the conflict
have been revealed. Studies show that this procedure—and the subsequent
expansion of judicial discretion in using it—has advanced conflict-resolution
procedures and has significantly diminished the number of cases ending
through full trial and judgment.167
In the absence of empirical data concerning the role of the judge as a promoter of conflict resolution during the litigation process, there are disparate
views on this matter. On the one hand, as shown above, a short preliminary
procedure such as summary judgment, which requires early and wide discovery, reveals the required information and motivates parties to reach a settlement. On the other hand, any ruling that is made during this stage may seriously compromise the chances of reaching a settlement. When a full
investigation of the case is refused, the defendant has no incentive to settle.
Conversely, a decision that the case should be fully litigated empowers the
plaintiff's confidence in his claims, thus minimizing his desire to end the case
through settlement.168
C. The New Judicial Sphere of the Adversarial Judge: The Israeli
Practice
This Article will now turn to look closely at the Israeli system, with its
recently effectuated civil procedure rules marking a prominent example for
inserting inquisitorial tools into the adversarial process, and thus affecting the
role of the judge as bearing mediational characteristics. This will enable us to
examine and analyze a few examples of continental-like procedures adopted
by a common law legal system and assimilated into the adversarial process,
namely, judges’ authority in the pretrial stage; judgment by way of
164
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compromise (according to section 79a of the Israeli Courts Law); and the doctrine of the inherent jurisdiction of the court.
i.

General Background: The New Israeli Rules of Civil Procedure

In order to examine the new judicial spheres within the Israeli system, this
Article will first distinguish between the activity of judges as case managers
who refer a case to another forum of dispute resolution, as opposed to cases
where judges attempt to settle the case themselves, either of their own initiative or in the framework of particular legislation that allows or even obliges
them to do so.169 Examples of the first group of mechanisms—directing and
diverting cases—include the internal organizational dispute-resolution system
of the Israeli court system, MAHUT,170 and its assimilation within the new
rules of civil procedure;171 legislation dealing with mandatory mediation
through external mediators;172 and legislation that requires utilization of the
mediation procedure prior to filing a lawsuit. In these scenarios, the judge
refers the parties to a forum that is related to the courtroom in some way, but
which is not an integral part of it, and the judge does not participate in the
resolution process. The new Israeli rules of civil procedure emphasize the diversion of cases to alternative dispute-resolution procedures as the preferred
path, one which is well-incorporated into the legal process.173 The mediator
in mandatory procedures enjoys, on the one hand, the advantages of institutional repute, having been given a mandate by the legal system, in this case
the primary customer. On the other hand, the mediator lacks any actual authority and their competence to settle the dispute varies from case to case and
further depends, among other factors, on the type of referral. The referral of
cases from the court system reflects the system’s attempt at efficiency, to decrease case load and minimize as much as possible the cost of litigation. In
this situation, the judge serves as an institutional functionalist, with the limited
169

See Perlman, supra note 14, at 367–68. Perlman proposed regulation of the procedure in Israel. Id. at 411–13.
170 Ch. G(1), Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
171 § 37, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15 (concerning the IAC mediators and the officer in charge of the alternative dispute resolution proceeding on behalf of
the court).
172 See, e.g., § 3, Law for the Settlement of Litigation in Family Disputes, 5775-2014,
SH 2485 116 (Isr.); see also Gali Aviv & Asaf Kshatot-Stein, Law for the Settlement of
Litigation in Family Disputes, The Israeli Courts Research Division (May 2019).
173 See §§ 34, 35A(2), 63B(17), New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15 (defining “alternative dispute resolution mechanism” in sections 34, 35A(2), and primarily
63B(17), according to which the court shall propose a settlement proposal or judgment by
way of compromise or an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the litigants). Thus,
Section 177(5) of the Regulations allows a legal assistant to present proposals to the litigants for referral of the suit to an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Id. § 177(5).
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role of diverting the case outside of the system. The managerial judge, or the
dispute designer judge,174 chooses not to hold a dispute resolution process
within the courtroom. This may be because there is no suitable legal procedure
or because of her belief that the particular dispute at hand has better chances
of being resolved with the assistance of a professional third party. It could also
be because of her self-perception as a ruling judge, or due to her inability to
adjust to a different type of discourse with the parties.
This Article will focus on the alternative stance whereby the judge positions herself as a dispute resolver—whether through means affirmatively afforded to her by law or means that the system allows by not prohibiting, or by
broadening judges’ discretion and scope of activity. All things being equal,
the passive role of the judge in the adversarial system, which grants the parties
significant control over the management of litigation, is actually in accordance
with the ideology of autonomy which is central to interest-based negotiation
and helps promote consent instead of a judicial ruling. Yet the parties in adversarial procedures will usually be represented by lawyers. The lawyers bring
into the process the only negotiation style they are familiar with: rights-based
discourse, which is a meeting of monologues.175 The adversarial courtroom,
in its original form, is a judge without the ability to significantly intervene,
whose discretion is grounded in and limited to existing rules of procedure and
whose decisions are examined in appellate courts. Litigants who have forgone
their ability to negotiate on their own are represented by legal agents who
engage solely in confrontational rights-based discourse. This setting cannot
foster consensual and peaceful discourse or a broad understanding of the dispute. When the parties do not have the ability to control the adversarial discourse in the courtroom, the only changeable element in this multi-player
event is the role of the judge. A change in the role of judges, or in their own
self-perception of their role, may lead to a different dialogue both within and
outside of the courtroom. Enhancing the involvement of the Israeli judge in
the management of the process through the introduction of inquisitorial-like
powers that afford the judge an active role in the negotiation between the parties has indeed instigated such a change.
The new Israeli rules of civil procedure formally express the kind of judicial activism that had already been taking place under the previous rules of
civil procedure. The new rules stress the managerial role of judges and reflect
judicial activism in the management of litigation and the efficient steering of
each case towards resolution of conflict between the parties. The new rules of
civil procedure place emphasis on fair trials, accessibility to the public, and

174

See Resnik, supra note 7, at 377, 425.
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ending disputes within reasonable timeframes.176 This framework allows for
judges to actively conduct judicial mediation.
For example, the new Rule 63(b)(17) specifically allows a judge in a pretrial hearing to bring before the parties a settlement proposal, to offer ruling
by way of compromise, or to suggest an alternative dispute-resolution procedure.177 These possibilities add to the already existing and broad range of inquisitorial-like powers held by judges in Israel, such as: ordering the addition
or removal of parties in a case, hearing testimony from any person present in
the courtroom during pretrial, ordering the parties to submit early evidence or
testimony, and giving any procedural order geared toward solving the dispute.
The inquisitorial involvement of judges during the pretrial phase creates an
effective platform for understanding the points of disagreement between the
parties at this early stage of litigation. It does so in a way that makes it possible
for the judge to present an informed settlement proposal to the parties.
The new rules of civil procedure enable the consented resolution of the
dispute at two different stages: first, through an out-of-court procedure, under
the supervision of the court in its institutional capacity; and second, when the
first option has failed, at the hands of the judge in her capacity as dispute
solver during pretrial. One can understand, therefore, that the main reason for
making procedural rules clearer, as well as strictly limiting the length of pleadings and expanding the judges’ authority, is the desire to allow judges to efficiently manage the procedure and focus only on the ability to reach a just
outcome in the shortest time possible.178 A central motif of the current climate
is granting the judge inquisitorial-like authority and expanding the judge’s active involvement in the process.
Taken from a different perspective, it could be that the new rules of civil
procedure somewhat limit judicial creativity; one could argue that the requirement the new rules have introduced, by which parties need to significantly
shorten pleadings and focus on the main aspects of the dispute and the related
arguments, could contribute to settling the case in a relatively short time, since
the parties themselves have already separated the wheat from the chaff. However, limiting the length of pleadings makes it impossible for the parties to
elaborate, thus harming their ability to provide the court with a better
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§ 2, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15. In this context, Section 5
prescribes the principle of the public’s accessibility to the legal system as a public interest,
including the conduct of a “quick and efficient” proceeding. Id. § 5. The issue of the speed
of the proceeding and reduction of scope of the text formally permitted to be used therein
affects the judge’s ability to conduct broad dispute resolution procedures vis-à-vis the parties in his courtroom.
177 Rule 63(b)(17), New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15.
178 See Pt. A, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15.
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understanding of the dispute at large.179 Parties will not be able to relate in
their short pleadings their interests, motivations, and relational elements,
which are details that could assist the judge in understanding the wider context
of the dispute, in order to settle it in a true mediational manner. Similarly,
limiting the number of pretrial hearings,180 like the situation in U.K. courts,
does not contribute to incentivizing the parties to reach a settlement. When
the number of pretrial hearings is limited, the process moves forward at a
faster pace than that needed to conduct an alternative process, especially in
large and complex cases. In this respect, it seems that the desire to make litigation more efficient and expedite the legal process, in effect, places the parties within a timeframe that actually limits the creative sphere and allows for
fewer opportunities to settle the case through active judicial involvement, a
process that sometimes requires of the court more time and procedural flexibility.181
The new Israeli rules of civil procedure thus reflect two trends. The first is
the attempt to strengthen the practice of holding mediation procedures outside
of court. This process reinforces the managerial institutional function of court
personnel who are not judges and their role in managing and ending cases
without significant judicial involvement. An example of this trend is the new
authority awarded to the clerks overseeing the mediation process who now
can, just like judges, impose sanctions on a party who did not attend a mediation process. For example, a party can be required to pay the mediation fees182
as part of the MAHUT project under which cases are referred to mediation
after the pleadings stage. In doing so, the new Israeli rules of civil procedure
underscore the significance of the preliminary stage in general, and the mediation stage in particular, by making it an integral part of the legal process itself. The judge, under this regime, plays a significant role in bringing the case
to a consented resolution. The second trend reflected in the new rules of civil
procedure is the strengthening of the active role of the judge in managing the
procedure, while better delineating the range of possibilities available to
judges.
This active role of judges is reinforced by the backdrop of the legal tradition from within which they preside. To begin with, the large scope of

179 This is despite the requirement in the Old Civil Procedure Regulations which requires pleadings to contain material details that are required for the discourse of rights only.
§ 9, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
180 See § 63, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15.
181 § 65C, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15. This section, which was
cancelled in the second correction (5780-2020), was not friendly to external settlement
negotiations, including mediation proceedings, which were not considered a sufficient
cause for rescheduling a hearing.
182 § 37J, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15; § 99G(c), Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
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discretion of adversarial judges intensifies their power and radiates upon their
actions as they apply conflict-resolution processes within the courtroom. The
ability of adversarial judges to integrate purposes, policy considerations, and
complex formulas183 makes it easier for them to develop and use different
techniques, among them techniques that help bring the parties to a consented
solution, such as settlement. The sphere of discretion of the Israeli judge in
employing tools of conflict resolution is intensified given the anti-formalistic
culture in Israel, where judges are expected to use their discretion at the stage
of judicial ruling (bear in mind that the same judge would hear the pretrial and
the trial itself if the case were not to settle).184 Such discretion could manifest
in the balancing of interests; the search for principles of proportionality; or in
applying tests of reasonableness, good faith, and other legal doctrines and
tools whose outcome is not always predictable before writing the final decision. The complexity and ambiguity—both related to the fact that the legal
outcome is not predictable in light of the informal tools that will be employed
within the legal process—broadens the sphere of conflict resolution for judges
and grants them more power, given the wide range of choices they have.
The integration of legal inquisitorial tools, along with judicial creativity
that can be applied regarding the characteristics of the dispute, is interwoven
with the enhanced ability of the court to introduce into the persuasion process
within the courtroom the complexity of the legal-normative situation of the
case at hand. The combination of these two fields—judicial discretion on the
legal plane and inquisitorial and conflict-resolution tools on the conflict management plane—forms a new creative space within which the judge can lead
the parties towards agreement and settlement in the courtroom.185
There are well-known techniques for bringing about settlement that can be
potentially assimilated within the courtroom without harming the necessary
judicial neutrality186 and other aspects of due process. These include the ability to predict and reflect to the parties possible legal outcomes of the case,
stressing the negative and unpredictable aspects of the legal process and its
possible outcomes, use of structural and procedural elements of the litigation
process (such as costs), intervening in the lawyer-client-court relationship, incentivizing negotiation between the parties outside of the courtroom, relating
to wide interests that do not necessarily fit in dominant legal rights discourse,
183

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
For further discussion on judicial discretion and the deviation of the legal text from
formalistic principles, see supra note 51.
185 Cf. Yuval Sinai & Michal Alberstein, Expanding Judicial Discretion: Between Legal and Conflict Considerations, 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 221 (2015) (presenting a hybrid
innovative model for judicial discretion and conflict resolution discretion which may be
used by judges to institutionalize and promote judicial conflict resolution).
186 See infra note 189 (describing the development of the legal discussion on causes for
judicial disqualification).
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and relating to parties’ motivations and parties’ or their lawyers’ reputations.
These practices, when combined with a softer, more empathic discourse, create a more open and approachable environment that enables a discussion
which includes extra-legal elements, bringing the parties and their attorneys
closer together. Methods that work towards consent, settlement, and reconciliation are employed to varying degrees, depending on each judge’s capabilities, experience, and expertise.187
Alongside the various practices described above, the prediction of the legal
outcome, which is a significant tool in the work of the evaluative mediator,188
serves as a central tool for judges throughout the legal process, and especially
during pretrial. Legal prediction makes it possible for the judge to present to
the parties a clear reality of the possible outcome of litigation, one which is
based on precedent, judicial knowledge, and experience. Consequently, the
judge’s involvement in the negotiation process, given the common law principle of precedent, necessarily provides more weight to the judge’s discretion
and the alternative to a court ruling, and bears greater impact on shaping the
settlement reached by the parties. It is reasonable, then, for a judge to act as
an evaluative mediator, and at the center of the negotiation towards settlement
will be predictions and evaluations concerning the legal trajectory of the conflict.
Yet, it must be noted that the practice of legal prediction is problematic
when used by the judge who then presides over the case until its end. In order
to avoid determining a judicial position before hearing the evidence, especially given the fact that the inability to sway a judge’s position is cause for
recusal,189 a practice of conducting settlement discussions “off the record” has
187

There are papers on judicial mediation, which predominantly analyze narrow and
limited interests. See Alberstein, supra note 8; Perlman, supra note 14, at 389; Mironi,
supra note 14, at 499; Finkelstein, supra note 110, at 650; Sela et al., supra note 8.
188 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 27 (1996).
189 § 77A, Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, SH 1383 68, as amended
(regulating the law of judicial disqualification and establishing a general cause for disqualification where “circumstances that create actual concern of bias in the conduct of the trial”
exist). It may be said that disqualification of a judge under Israeli law requires that it be
shown that, in the eyes of a reasonable judge, there is actual concern that the specific judge
has formed his opinion and is no longer open to persuasion, although he has the duty to be
open to persuasion at the relevant point in time. The evidence in support of a cause for
disqualification must be significant. See YIGAL MERSEL, DINI PASLOT SHOFAT [JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION LAW] (2006); CivA 11146/08 Eiriat Or Akiva Neged Ben Nayim [Mun.
of Or Akiva v. Shlomo Ben Nayim], Nevo Legal Database (Jan. 18, 2009) (Isr.). Case law
emphasizes that conciliation attempts by the court, even if they express a certain position
with respect to the proceeding, do not establish actual concern that the judge is biased or
has already resolutely made up his mind, and therefore do not constitute a cause for disqualification. Mun. of Or Akiva, supra; CivA 7386/08 Eilat Inn Be'am Neged Chacham
[Eilat Inn Ltd. v. Mickey Chacham], Nevo Legal Database (Oct. 26, 2008) (Isr.); CivA
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developed, and judges’ predictions are not registered as part of the court transcript.190 What was said off the record cannot serve as a basis for judicial ruling, should there be one. Still, this practice remains problematic in that the
same judge who holds this external dialogue with the parties will also rule in
the case eventually, if it is not settled. There is a question as to how the parties
are asked to trust the judge under these conditions, and specifically, to trust in
his or her ability to disregard initial predictions when making judgment. In the
following section, this Article will review three unique elements that create a
special judicial sphere in Israeli civil litigation.
a. Rule 79A of the Israeli Courts Law (1984)
Placing control over the proceedings in the hands of judges, rather than the
parties and their attorneys, while minimizing judicial review of judges’ rulings, receives unique expression in Rule 79A of the Israeli Courts Law. The
rule authorizes judges to give a “ruling by way of compromise.”191 According
to this unique procedure, the adversarial judge, equipped with inquisitorial
tools, is transformed from an involved spectator to an active participant with
the ability to judge, based on how he perceives the parties’ wishes, and what
he sees as the best way to lead them to settle.192 The nature of the judicial
decision under this unique procedure, as well as its almost complete immunity
from the intervention of appellate courts,193 reflects an extreme on the
2634/07 Zehavi Neged Hickry [Zehavi v. Hickry], Nevo Legal Database (July 16, 2007)
(Isr.). The court’s opinion that one of the parties is in a better opening position, from a legal
perspective, cannot either, in itself, establish a cause for disqualification. CivA 9191/00
Ventura Tikshoret Proiekt Internet Israel Be'am Neged Sertei Hayam Ha'adom Be'am
[Ventura Commc’ns Isr. Internet Project Ltd. v. Red Sea Films Ltd.], Nevo Legal Database
(Feb. 21, 2001) (Isr.); CivA 287/88 Manof Signal Hevra Lefinanceim Vehaskahot Be'am
Neged Abdel Razek Salayme [Manof Signal Fin. & Inv. Co. Ltd. v. Abdel Razek Salayme]
44(3) PD 758 (1988) (Isr.). Therefore, such assessment, if made at a preliminary stage of
the proceeding (e.g., a pretrial hearing) and on a prima facie basis, cannot lead to disqualification of the judge, because a judge of the court is presumed not to arrive at a final
decision on the law and on the matter before her prior to the conclusion of all trial proceedings, and the mere suggestion of a settlement proposal by the judge does not indicate that
the court has formed a final opinion on the proceeding to which the proposal pertains.
MERSEL, supra, at 178–80; Eilat Inn Ltd., supra; CivA 4601/07 Hamda Neged Kial
[Hamda v. Nihal Kial], Nevo Legal Database (Jan. 7, 2008) (Isr.); CivA 7265/98 Halichal
Neged Bersky [Halichal v. Bersky], 52(5) PD 477 (Jan. 14, 1999) (Isr.).
190 Rule 13, Rules of Ethics for Judges, 5767-2007, KT 6591 934 (concerning settlement, mediation, and arbitration).
191 § 79A, Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, SH 1383 68, as amended.
192 See Ben-Noon & Gabrieli, supra note 30, at 258, 280.
193 Id. at 260; CivA 1639/97 Agiapolis Be'am Neged Hacustodia Internazionala de
Terra Santa [Agiapolis Ltd. v. Custodia Internazionala de Terra Santa], 53(1) PD 337
(1999) (Isr.); CivA 8560/17 Edri El Israel Karkaot Be'am Neged Afiki Nadlan Bazafon
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spectrum of inquisitorial-like powers that are granted to judges in Israel. This
is especially true when considering that judges base their rulings on their own
investigation and understanding of the facts during any stage of the factuallegal discussion,194 and sometimes even before most of the evidence has been
brought before the court.
The authority to make a ruling by way of compromise could be understood
as limiting the judge to middle-ground solutions or this authority could be
seen as a judicial stipulation, like an arbitration agreement that sets clear
boundaries of process and means of ruling.195 In practice, however, Rule 79A
grants judges a very wide scope of discretion.196 This procedure is based on
judicial expertise which allows the judge to reach a ruling that the judge is not
obliged to explain and justify and that does not necessarily stem from rules of
evidence or substantive law. Such a ruling could be defined as “intuitive,” and
is grounded in substantial faith in the ability of judges to find the truth and
reach a just settlement based on their status and experience. In a way, the
judge’s authority in this process aligns perfectly with the inquisitorial tradition.197 The parties authorize the judge to make a ruling based on the documents before her, without completing the evidentiary stage, and without the
obligation of a full, reasoned verdict. It is reasonable to assume that in most
Be'am [Edri El Isr. Land Ltd. v. N. Real Est. Channels Ltd.], Nevo Legal Database (Dec.
11, 2017) (Isr.); LCivA 2628/09 Levine Neged Assor [Levine v. Assor], Nevo Legal Database (Sep. 21, 2009) (Isr.); LCivA 7406/08 Tavor Neged Benori [Tavor v. Benori], Nevo
Legal Database (May 6, 2009) (Isr.); CivA 6780/19 Medinat Israel Neged Istadrot Meditsinit Hadassa [State of Isr. v. Org. Med. Hadassa], Nevo Legal Database (Aug. 16, 2020)
(Isr.). Even if the parties’ agreement under this section does not inherently deny them the
right to appeal, intervention by the court of appeals is limited solely to rare cases where:
(1) The court shall have exceeded its authority; (2) The court shall have
arrived at conclusions and outcomes that are completely unreasonable on
the face of it; (3) The court shall have completely ignored the arguments of
the parties’ counsel; (4) The court shall not have allowed the parties’ counsel to present their arguments; (5) Other grounds of importance based on
which the outcome of the judgment cannot, under any circumstances, be
tolerated, e.g., the court shall have erred in understanding the agreement
between the parties and such error is apparent on the face of it.
LCivA 2587/98 Meidenberg Yetsor Obneiat Mivnim Be'am Neged Sasson [Meidenberg
Structure Constr. & Manufacture Ltd. v. Sasson], Nevo Legal Database (Aug. 23, 1999)
(Isr.).
194 Sela & Gabay-Egozi, supra note 103, at 13.
195 See Yuval Sinai & Michal Alberstein, Court Arbitration by Compromise: Rethinking Delaware’s State Sponsored Arbitration Case, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y, & ETHICS
J. 739, 739–41 (2015).
196 Id. at 741; CivA 1639/97 Agiapolis Be'am Neged Hacustodia Internazionala de
Terra Santa [Agiapolis Ltd. v. Custodia Internazionala de Terra Santa], 53(1) PD 337
(1999) (Isr.).
197 Ben-Noon & Gabrieli, supra note 30, at 266–70; CivA (DC TA) 2156/08 Peretz
Neged Dombalsky [Peretz v. Dombalsky], Nevo Legal Database (Jan. 13, 2010) (Isr.).
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cases, judges use this rule to provide an approximate ruling, or one that is
based only on written data, similar to the work of the inquisitorial judge.198
The more information a ruling based on Rule 79A takes into account and the
more advanced the stage of the process, the more similar it becomes to a ruling
of an inquisitorial judge; in practice, many of the civil cases in Israel are managed with party consent according to this method.199
Given that the judge’s considerations, as well as the way in which she
views the conflict, the parties’ interests, and the range of solutions they might
agree to, are not known to the parties when they authorize the judge to make
a ruling based on Rule 79A, they take a chance regarding the expected outcome. This element of uncertainty might deter parties and their attorneys from
agreeing to a ruling based on Rule 79A. Even the attempt to create a practical
formula for calculating the sum that would be awarded by the court fails to
minimizing the fears that are inherent to this type of adjudication.200 Nevertheless, the rise of the status of judges in a way that is foreign to the traditional
role of adversarial judges creates the kind of trust in judges that helps parties
give them the authority to end the case by way of compromise, without a reasoned decision that is the outcome of an organized evidentiary procedure. A
combination of persuasion and consent determine the mechanism for the resolution of the conflict. This process is grounded in seeking compromise—not
necessarily in the legal sense—where the expectations of the parties are that
the resolution of the case will be based on just grounds and broad considerations. Among these considerations is the judge’s understanding of the parties’
interests and each side’s boundaries concerning an acceptable outcome or settlement. Parties’ consent to this form of adjudication demonstrates the high
degree of trust that they and their lawyers place in judges in a manner not
typical to the adversarial system. Yet, in a way, agreeing to receive any outcome through a ruling by way of compromise is identical to agreeing to receiving a fully reasoned judgment, as both represent a decision to turn to the
procedures of the legal system. In this sense, the significance of consent is not
with regard to the way in which the conflict has ended, but relates only to the
mechanism chosen for ending it.
It seems that the process of parties authorizing the judge to seek compromise and the use of the term “compromise” both impact the perception of the
role of the judge, who receives a new kind of trust from the parties. In return
198

See Sela & Gabay-Egozi, supra note 103.
There is a similarity between this form of decision and the criminal mediation presently employed in criminal trials. See Ami Kobo, Hagishor Haplili [Criminal Mediation],
24 HAMISHPAT 301 (2017) (Isr.); Michal Alberstein & Beatrice Coscas Williams, Quelle
place pour la victime d'infraction pénale dans la médiation pénale en Israël? [What Place
for the Victim of Criminal Offense in Criminal Mediation in Israel?], in LES CAHIERS DE LA
JUSTICE 2018/3 REVUE DALLOZ 509 (2018) (Fr.).
200 Klein, supra note 30.
199
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for this trust, the judge sees to some of the essential interests of the parties as
they are presented to her. The ability of the judge to conduct a different kind
of dialogue with the parties and their attorneys, and their willingness to authorize her to make a ruling even before they have had the opportunity to present the full evidentiary picture of the case, somewhat softens the legal process
and brings into the courtroom a new way of thinking.201 From the moment the
parties forego formal procedure, including the possibility to monitor the judge
and appeal her decision,202 and instead grant her the authority to make a ruling
without providing reasoning—in an intuitive manner to a large extent—a ruling that is not bound by law, the judge has become an active participant in an
alternative discourse with the parties, one that is broader and more diverse.
Within such discourse, the judge is not obligated either to focus on the specifics of the law, or on rights-based discourse. Moreover, the parties are willing
to put the decision in the judge’s hands since they perceive her as someone
who understands the broad interests and wishes of each party. They also trust
that she will take these elements into consideration when making her decision,
based on compromise and consent. This technique, therefore, establishes double trust: the parties trust in the understanding, skill, and decency of the judge
to make a ruling in their case without procedural safeguards or evidentiary
tools; from this follows trust in the procedure itself, as one that allows the
judge to rule according to it. The inquisitorial element inherent to this unique
rule, combined with the wide discretion granted to judges in common law
systems, generate the necessary trust of the parties, who believe that the outcome under this procedure will be close to what the parties themselves would
have agreed on if they had the ability to reach a settlement on their own. The
compromise, in this sense, is an expected outcome that takes into account the
parties’ essential interests and, accordingly, allows judges the ability to declare, by way of judicial ruling, the parties’ consent.
b. The Pretrial
Another example of the assimilation of inquisitorial procedures within the
Israeli legal system is the institutionalization of the pretrial stage, which allows the judge significant involvement in the process while decreasing the
201 Indeed, the adversarial courts’ role of incentivizing dispute resolution proceedings
has grown concurrently with the tempering of their adversarial nature. Cortés, supra note
79, at 63 (discussing cases in the U.K.); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS viii (1981).
202 CivA 10838/05 Sax Neged Klinger [Sax v. Klinger], Nevo Legal Database (Mar.
23, 2008) (Isr.) (stating that the purpose of the appeal-limiting approach in 79A is the purpose of the section itself, which allows the parties to conclude the dispute quickly and
efficiently, while saving on costs, as well as relieving the workload of the court, and the
expectation of continued litigation on appeal is necessarily also reduced).
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control of the parties and their attorneys.203 During pretrial, the judge holds
the reins, initiating procedures to move the case forward and even calling and
examining witnesses or the parties themselves, all based on broad discretion.
During the pleadings stage, as well as the evidentiary stage, the adversarial
characteristics are more dominant. Yet even during the evidentiary stage, the
judge will express her opinion regarding the weight of certain testimony and
evidence and will encourage the parties to reach a settlement.204 The involvement of the judge during pretrial, which is intended, first and foremost, to find
at least partial solutions and minimize the gap between the parties with regards
to power and resources, narrows the possibility of injustice due to power imbalances between the parties. Moreover, it allows the judge to steer the main
discussion in the case towards essential rulings on the questions brought before the court.205 It is the flexible nature of the pretrial, and the extra involvement of the judge in directly conversing with the parties and their attorneys,
that helps minimize the imbalances between the parties.
Rule 140 of the previous Israeli civil procedure rules awards the judge the
authority to set a pretrial hearing to explore the possibility of reaching a settlement between the parties.206 Another, more specific, rule dealing with fasttrack cases allows the judge “to offer the parties a settlement proposal, to rule
by way of compromise, according to Article 79A of the Israeli Courts Law or,
based on the parties’ request, approve and validate a settlement they have
reached on their own” (i.e., grant it the status of a court ruling).207 In the New
Civil Procedure Regulations, judges’ authority to offer a settlement in pretrial
has been implemented in a more general rule that applies to all civil cases.208
In doing so, the new rules formalize the existing practice of judges who continue to offer settlement proposals to the parties even after the pretrial, as the
information in the case accumulates. Yet, the discourse during pretrial remains the most appropriate context for the judge to gain a direct impression
of the parties before her. In turn, this helps her navigate the course of the case
in the most egalitarian manner while focusing on the essential interests of each

203

See LCivA 3312/04 Assurance General De France Neged Hakones Harishmi
Betafkido Kemefarek Bank Tsafon America Be'am [Assurance Gen. De Fr. v. Off. Receiver in his Capacity as the Liquidator of the N. Am. Bank], 60(3) PD 245 (Oct. 26, 2005)
(Isr.). See also §§ 143–47, Civil Procedure Regulations, 5744-1984 (Isr.) (authorizing the
court to take various measures for pretrial purposes or at the actual pretrial hearing). Such
powers were expanded and clarified in the New Civil Procedure Regulations, as specified
above. § 63, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15.
204 LEVIN, supra note 60, at 126–28, 149–53.
205 See § 3(b)(7), Court Regulations (Department for Assigning Cases in Courts and
Labor Courts), 5762-2002, KT 6189 1198.
206 § 140, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
207 Id. § 214K(d)(8).
208 § 63, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15.
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party and allowing them to present the whole of their side in order to determine where each party stands during this early stage.209
Since it is difficult to infer the legislature’s intentions in creating the rules
concerning pretrial,210 their inquisitorial nature is revealed by their content as
well as from the literature.211 The accepted view is that the pretrial has replaced the “preliminary hearing” that used to be held at the district court in
Tel Aviv. This practice was mainly intended to examine the possibility of settling the case, arranging the pleadings, and determining the stages and course
of the litigation process. The “preliminary hearing” was not grounded in the
rules of civil procedure and probably originated as part of the court’s inherent
powers doctrine.212
The pretrial was intended to remedy some faults of the adversarial procedure rather than abandoning this system altogether. This includes controlling
for the possibility of misuse of the legal procedure by the usage of baseless
claims; misuse of the pleading stage by employing lawyerly trickery, which
often conceals the true disagreements between the parties and the actual interests involved;213 and finally, dealing with the excess inflexibility of pleadings
under this system, which interferes with the judicial process making it more
difficult to reach just solutions.214 Given the success of pretrial proceedings in
the American legal system, the Israeli rules of civil procedure are based on
the American model.215
209 However, although the extent of the judge’s involvement in the examination of witnesses is larger than before, the rule still holds that the court will only rarely summon witnesses of its own initiative (as opposed to summoning the parties themselves). CivA 125/89
CPA Balas Neged Izavon Hamanocha Rosa Rosenberg [Balas v. Est. of the Late Rosa
Rosenberg] OBM, 46(4) PD 441, 450–51 (1992) (Isr.). See also § 178, Old Civil Procedure
Regulations, supra note 17 (concerning the summoning of witnesses by the court).
210 Preceding explanatory notes and transcripts are not accessible, because the Rules
are not a statute, but rather regulations. See §§ 143–47, Civil Procedure Regulations, 57231963, KT 1477 1853 (Isr.); Ch. M, §§ 143–47, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra
note 17. See also Goldstein & Burnovsky, supra note 121, at 324–26.
211 Goldstein & Burnovsky, supra note 121; see also ADI AZAR, KDAM MISPHAT
[PRETRIAL] 125 (1999) (Isr.) (“According to the modern approach, the pretrial is a procedural proceeding of inquisitorial nature. The court holds vast powers for clarification of the
dispute, for examination of the foundation of the arguments and for appropriate influence
on the achievement of settlements or procedural agreements, which are intended to narrow
down the dispute”); AZAR, supra, at 41 (“At the pretrial stage, the proceeding tilts toward
the German system, whereas in the trial itself (the evidence presentation stage) the system
tilts once more in the adversarial direction.”).
212 Goldstein & Burnovsky, supra note 121, at 325. See also Ex Parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (“Courts have . . . inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.”).
213 Goldstein & Burnovsky, supra note 121, at 322 n.36.
214 Id. at 313–15.
215 Id. at 316, 318–20.
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The initial exposure of the judge to the case and the parties before her is
designed to determine the procedure for the hearing of evidence and the management of the entire litigation process. However, due to its role as a framework for conflict resolution and expedited inquiry of the points of disagreement based on a clear intent to resolve the conflict there and then, this meeting
has become a series of hearings, which deviates from the original objective.
The average number of pretrial hearings in a regular civil case in Israel has
reached 1.7 or higher,216 illustrating that the significance of the preliminary
hearing extends far beyond organizing the procedural aspects of the litigation
of the case.
During pretrial, a judge is authorized to order that any party or person that
is relevant to the dispute appear before the court and give testimony.217 This
authority is identical to that of the examining magistrate (in inquisitorial systems), who chooses to manage the case by way of summoning the witnesses
who are required for revealing the truth.218 The summoning of witnesses is no
longer exclusively at the discretion of the parties and their attorneys; rather,
the judge becomes an active participant in designing the process that will lead
to her eventual legal ruling.219 This procedure allows the judge to set paths
other than those required to reach a legal determination, including introducing
into the courtroom the kind of discourse that evolves in pretrial with the witnesses or other litigants summoned by the judge. The result is a more inclusive
and appeasing discourse that deals with the broad interests of the parties. The
opportunity to conduct direct dialogue with litigants allows for observation
and understanding of the motives leading up to the conflict. While the original
grounds for introducing pretrial into adversarial procedures was the desire to
make the legal process more efficient,220 the tools afforded to judges within

216

In Israel, the judge presiding over the pretrial is also the judge who will conduct the
entire proceeding until a decision is handed down by judgment (where the case reaches the
decision stage). On the other hand, in the United States, separation is applied in this context—one judge conducts the pretrial, including settlement negotiations, whereas another
judge presides over the main proceeding. See Sela et al., supra note 8, at 98; Roselle L.
Wissler, Court-Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 271, 272–73 (2011).
217 §§ 146–47, Old Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 17.
218 See id.
219 Shalev Ginossar, Beshuley Hachakika – Ma Nishtana Baprotsedura Haezrachit [On
the Fringes of Legislation – What has Changed in Civil Procedure], 19 HAPRAKLIT 315
(1963) (Isr.). According to Ginossar’s approach, the Regulations enable the judge to step
out of his passive role of observation and inference, and she is required to strive to uncover
the issues in dispute, and, to that end, make any determination and demand anything whatsoever that may be of assistance to her. Id. at 323. For this purpose, she may examine the
litigants at an early stage of the proceeding, before the pleadings force the court to address
many other witnesses Id. at 324.
220 §§ 140–50, Civil Procedure Regulations, 5723-1963, KT 1477 1853 (Isr.).
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this framework have given rise to a process which, when employed wisely,
promotes discourse of another nature.221
The summoning of witnesses at this early stage to better elucidate the
pleadings in itself incentivizes the parties to reach an agreement. The investigation of a witness by the judge may lead the parties to gain new insight that
does not necessarily fit with their initial aspirations. This insight includes the
understanding that their original expectations were not realistic, as well as a
better understanding of the factual reality that either supports or refutes their
original claims. Accordingly, this helps the parties understand the feasibility
of a settlement and the reasonableness and proportionality that are required to
reach an agreement. This preliminary investigation creates a more suitable
environment for compromise since the legal costs are still low at this stage, so
the parties may be willing to invest money they were prepared to spend on
trial as part of the settlement agreement.
The ability of the judge to directly approach the parties themselves in a
way that allows them, for the first time, to speak in a language that is not
overly formal or formalistic creates a new discourse and a unique atmosphere.
It represents a transition from a place in which pleadings serve as the only
discussion until after the hearing of evidence and witnesses, to a place in
which the parties tell their own story at a stage when the judge cannot yet rule.
Judges’ investigations of witnesses or parties are conducted in a balanced,
moderate manner. The investigations are directed towards finding the truth,
and as such, they create a broader perception of the conflict through direct
dialogue. Such discourse provides opportunities for finding a just and suitable
solution, which remains faithful to the legal and factual reality that was revealed before the judge during pretrial. Were it not for this unique tool, the
judge would be exposed to the complete details of the case for the first time
only after the evidentiary stage, or sometimes even after the summation of the
case. The expansion of authority of judges during pretrial turns them into case
managers, investigating the parties and examining the evidence. This expansion forms the basis of a conflict resolution process that is guided by the judge,
one constructed upon the parties’ own stories, along with an early and thorough knowledge of the facts and evidence in the case. This process also rejects
adversarial characteristics which, as mentioned before, conceal the true nature
of the conflict.
In addition, the pretrial can prevent escalation of conflict that may occur
after the parties have been exposed to each other’s affidavits and need to bring
in additional witnesses to substantiate their claims.222 In pretrial, the judge can
221 Ze’ev Tzeltner, Yeilut Bebeit Hamisphat [Efficiency in Courts], 23 HAPRAKLIT 189
(1967) (Isr.). The pretrial proceeding is the right platform for concluding the trial by way
of compromise. Id. at 192.
222 Yet, it is actually affidavits—which as a rule contain conjectures, motives, and hearsay—that form a more extensive document than pleadings, occasionally also reflecting the
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base her opinion on preliminary evidence and her own investigation, rather
than basing it only on the agenda promoted by the parties. Discussion in the
presence of the parties and their attorneys mitigates, at least to some degree,
the cognitive biases typical of legal adversaries. These biases characterize the
litigation process, which here can be avoided before the process has started.223
For the sake of legal prediction, a position based on evidence and a deeper
understanding of the case is more convincing and will be a far more effective
and authoritarian tool in a judge’s attempt to resolve the conflict between the
parties.
The presence of a third party who holds the authority to uncover the truth,
one who has the ability to speak with litigants above the heads of their lawyers, and, in doing so, diverts the discussion away from confrontation, provides a unique platform for the evolving perception of the judge as a conflict
resolver.224 The judge as conflict resolver works to delay the evidentiary stage
of litigation to minimize legal costs and prevent the escalation that often ensues with the submission of evidence. This reality stands in opposition to the
original objective of the pretrial: to expedite the litigation process and make
it more efficient. Delay is now initiated by the judge, and occurs through the
setting of several pretrial hearings,225 referring the parties to out-of-court mediation or insisting on a thorough completion of all preliminary procedures
before the trial can move forward. All of the above incentivizes the parties
and their lawyers to bring before the court the whole of the controversy, including essential evidence that supports each side’s version, during the pretrial
stage. These actions shift the center of gravity of the litigation to the beginning
of the process, causing fundamental changes in legal procedures and relative
parties’ true interests by laying down the entire story before the court. In this context only,
it may be argued that the affidavit, which is required for support and evidence, mitigates
the initial positions set out in the pleadings and establishes a broader story, which provides
the judge with an effective and wide picture of the discourse before her. It may thus be said
that the affidavit serves the court as an efficient instrument in its examination of alternative
ways to resolve the dispute.
223 On cognitive biases, see Ben-Noon, supra note 41, at 189; Michal Alberstein, Al
Kshalim, Ratsionaliut Mogbelet, Vekolot Negdiim: Tarbuyot shel Masa Umatan, Veshel
Mishphat [Of Failures, Limited Rationality and Counter Voices: Cultures of Negotiation
and Law], in LAW SOCIETY AND CULTURE – LOVE SENTENCES 657 (2005) (Isr.).
224 See Perlman, supra note 14, at 368 (making a distinction between a narrow model
of settlement-oriented judicature, under which striving for a settlement originates from
considerations of efficiency and cost saving, compared with a broad model, under which
judicial activity is driven by the ideology and value of favoring a quality solution which,
beyond addressing rights that concern needs and interests, factors in relationships and psychological wellbeing). Also see the principle suggested by Daicoff, which addresses everything beyond rights, Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The “Comprehensive
Law Movement”, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 4 (2006).
225 But see § 63, New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15 (striving to shorten
the pretrial stage by limiting the number of pretrial hearings).
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burdens of proof. All of this occurs in a manner in which each party brings
before the judge every detail that may affect the possible paths towards settlement.
c.

The Inherent Powers Doctrine

Another tool with inquisitorial characteristics that is used in adversarial
legal systems is the doctrine of “inherent powers” of the court,226 whereby the
court grants itself authority to rule upon matters that existing law does not
specifically authorize it to rule on.227 This is an exception to the principle of
legality and the general rule that any state authority only bears the powers that
were specifically granted to it by law. This rule is intended to limit and restrain
the power of state authorities, including the judicial branch, to prevent arbitrariness and tyranny and strengthen the fundamental democratic principle of
checks and balances.228 The doctrine of inherent power was recognized by
courts to create procedural tools and correct procedural flaws, without the
need for specific authorization in existing laws.229 Such empowerment of the
judge’s authority is only exercised in exceptional cases.230 Examples include
when the judge believes that the specific circumstances before her, as well as
considerations of justice, entail not preventing necessary legal remedy,231 or
when the judge believes exercising the power is necessary in order to maintain

226 There is no difference between use of the term “inherent jurisdiction” and use of the
term “inherent powers,” and the doctrine applies not only to superior courts, but is implemented in practice by all courts. Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere, The Inherent Jurisdiction and
Its Limits, 13 OTAGO L. REV. 107, 110 (2013). See also Cocker v. Tempest (1841) 151 Eng.
Rep. 864, 7 M. & W. 502, 503–04 (U.K.) (“The power of each Court over its own process
is unlimited; it is a power incident to all Courts, inferior as well as superior; were it not so,
the Court would be obliged to sit still and see its own process abused for the purpose of
injustice.”).
227 See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 233–77; FamA 3778/12 Galfenbeum Neged Medinat Israel [Galfenbeum v. State of Isr.], Nevo Legal Database (Sept. 29, 2014); LCivA
6339/97 Roker Neged Salomon [Roker v. Salomon], 55(1) PD 199 (1999) (Isr.); LCivA
2327/11 Ploni Neged Ploni [John Doe v. John Roe], Nevo Legal Database (Apr. 28, 2011).
228 See I. H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
23, 51 (1970) (defining inherent jurisdiction as a necessary and equitable doctrine that
judges rely on to ensure due process, prevent oppression and secure fairness between parties.); Rodriguez Ferrere, supra note 226, at 108–10.
229 Jacob, supra note 228, at 24.
230 See Jolowicz, supra note 35, at 281; LCivA 1233/91 Garbi Neged Ben David [Garbi
v. Ben David], 45(5) PD 661, 668 (1991) (Isr.); Roker, 55(1) PD 199; John Doe, LCivA
2327/11.
231 CivA 230/87 Shkolnik Neged Zakai [Shkolnik v. Zakai], 46(3) PD 279, 284 (1992)
(Isr.).
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the court’s essential role and its institutional status and capability.232 Given
the problematic nature of this doctrine as an exception to the principle of legality, the Israeli courts have interpreted the inherent power doctrine in a very
strict and minimal fashion. It is applied only as a residual solution and mainly
with regards to procedural questions, and is used only in rare cases when there
is no harm to basic rights and with particular sensitivity to natural justice principles.233 Judicial deeds based on the inherent powers doctrine are detached
from the parties’ procedural conduct, the rules of evidence, and sometimes
even the instructions of substantive law. These actions stem from the judge’s
perception of her own role and her desire to reach a just outcome.
The content of the inherent powers of the court remains unclear and
vague,234 and it is difficult to create a clear definition for this term. Given a
judge’s authority to make decisions that are not in accordance with the rules
of procedure, the inability of parties to predict the use that a judge might make
of this power is an incentive to try and end the conflict.235 While legal systems
that give wide interpretation to this authority can be found,236 the scope of the
doctrine and its limits can be inferred from the practice of how courts actually
use it.237 The most typical examples would be when a court uses its inherent
232 Case 678/82 Tayar Neged Medinat Israel [Meir Tayar v. State of Isr.], 36(3) PD 386
(1982) (Isr.).
233 John Doe, LCivA 2327/11.
234 Roker, 55(1) PD at 264–68.
235 The general definition of “inherent jurisdiction” prevalent in common law countries
was conceived by scholar Sir Jack Jacob as follows: “residual source of powers, which the
court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to
ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do
justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.” Jacob, supra note 228,
at 51. See also Rodriguez Ferrere, supra note 226, at 108. This definition was affirmed by
the supreme courts of Canada, England, and New Zealand. In Canada, which has embraced
this definition, it was determined that inherent jurisdiction may be used in many cases and
in various forms, as none of the theories of inherent jurisdiction purport to define its
bounds, and the courts will examine the use thereof according to the circumstances on a
case-by-case basis. See R v. Caron, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 78, 94 (Can.); Ocean v. Econ. Mut.
Ins. Co., [2009] 281 N.S.R. 2d 201 (Can.).
236 M. S. Dockray, The Inherent Jurisdiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings, 113 L.Q.
REV 120, 120 (1997).
237 See Dalia Even, Shamchuto Hatvuaha shel Beit Hamisphat – Makor Leseadei
Yosher [The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court – A Source of Equitable Remedies], 7
MISHPATIM 490 (1977) (Isr.); ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 228; Pinchas Goldstein,
Hasamchut Hatvuaha shel Beit Hamishpat [The ‘Inherent Jurisdiction’ of the Court], 10
IYUNEI MISHPAT 37 (1984) (Isr.); Jacob, supra note 228 (reviewing the uses made by courts
under this definition and finding five prominent criteria: the use applies to procedure rather
than substance, i.e., the doctrine is an instrument for the administration of justice rather
than justice itself; a shortened proceeding rather than a full evidentiary proceeding; the
doctrine applies to everyone not only the parties to the proceeding; the power is completely
different than the court’s use of ordinary judicial discretion; the rules of inherent
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powers in making procedural decisions relating to matters that were not regulated by the legislator, and the extension of appointed schedules that were set
by legislation or in previous court decisions. In such cases, the court has extended its own authority while simultaneously recognizing its subordination
to the basic principles of the legal system: natural justice, reasonableness, and
constitutional rights.238
The inherent powers doctrine allows the judge to apply her own interpretation to minimize the gap between the legal reality and what a just outcome
where there are no clear rules that prevent her from doing so. Thus, from a
theoretical standpoint, the doctrine establishes a wider procedural sphere and
serves as a tool that blurs a clear-cut legal outcome. The implication of the
ability of judges to exercise this doctrine is the involvement, at times unexpected, of the judge in the process before her, and a way to bypass findings
and facts that were presented during the legal process, all in order to reach a
legal conclusion that fits with the judge’s own perception. This is a judicial
technique of an active judge which does not fit within the traditional role of
the adversarial judge. This requires a process of inference, which is neither
linear nor a direct outcome of the legal and factual findings, with an objective
to rectify social order even when strict legal procedure and interpretation
would have led to a different outcome.239
Exercising this authority affords the judge the ability to bring the parties
to a settlement, even when there is a seemingly clear expectation concerning
a certain legal outcome. This is because it remains possible that the judge will
reach another conclusion. This is true despite the authority’s rare use, and further, despite its use only under unique circumstances and with regard to procedural questions.240 Exercising the inherent powers doctrine is a tool which
is not a part of the usual discretion of judges, or even part of the usual policy

jurisdiction are an addition to, not a substitute for, the rules of the court). See also the
instructive analysis by Honorable Justice Danziger in John Doe, LCivA 2327/11.
238 See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 228; HCJ 4703/14 Sharon Neged Nasi Beit Hamishpat Haelion [Sharon v. Chief Just. of the Sup. Ct.], Nevo Legal Database (Nov. 30, 2014)
(Isr.); LCivA 4088/14 Badir Neged Rashut Mekarkeai Israel [Badir v. Isr. Land Auth.],
Nevo Legal Database (July 2, 2014) (Isr.); M.T.A. 2911/16 Medinat Israel Rashut Hamisim
Neged Minrav [State of Isr. Tax Auth. v. Minrav], Nevo Legal Database (Apr. 25, 2016)
(Isr.). Court rulings hold additional examples of the use of the inherent jurisdiction made
by courts. For further details, see ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21, at 228–33, and the references
mentioned there; Amal Jabarin, Hazchut Leanonimiut, Zchut Hagisha Learkaot; Samchut
Tvuaha Vema Shebinehaen [The Right to Anonymity, the Right of Access to Court, Inherent
Jurisdiction and their Interrelations], 29 MEHKAREI MISHPAT 309 (2013) (Isr.).
239 See FamA 3778/12 Galfenbeum Neged Medinat Israel [Galfenbeum v. State of Isr.],
Nevo Legal Database (Sept. 29, 2014) (Isr.); Roker, 55(1) PD 199; Sharon, HCJ 4703/14;
Badir, LCivA 4088/14; Minrav, M.T.A. 2911/16.
240 John Doe, LCivA 2327/11.
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making and values typical to the work of the adversarial judge.241 It decreases
certainty regarding the expected legal outcome as it grants the judge the authority to lead the parties to a consented outcome that is different from the one
that would have been reached through linear legal judgment. The very possibility, even if rare, that the judge may use this procedure effectively grants the
judge the power to blur the legal prediction concerning the outcome of the
case, thereby incentivizing the parties to enter a process of negotiation and
settle. When the parties’ predictive ability is undermined in light of the inherent powers doctrine, their interest to shift to a path of compromise and consent
increases.
D. Examples of New Judicial Spheres in England
The English legal system adopted practices of an inquisitorial nature, including the use of dispute-resolution mechanisms. The philosophical grounds
for the assimilation of inquisitorial ideology within English law can be attributed to the Lord Woolf reform.242 This reform regulated preliminary procedures and pre-action protocols in a way that enables the maximization of
settlement processes, with the positive declaration that litigation should be the
“last resort.”243 This transforms the ideology at the heart of the adversarial
procedure from the notion of “justice on the merits” to “access to justice.”244
The committee, in examining the failures and flaws of the existing legal system, especially concerning providing practical and swift response to the management of conflicts, inserted a basic principle of the inquisitorial system into
the heart of methods that characterize the management of procedures in the
countries of origin of the adversarial legal system.245 The doctrine was implemented in the rules of civil procedure of England and Wales, and in practice
was applied via procedures that made possible mediation and arbitration as an
integral part of the legal system.246 The approach that was considered an
241

This doctrine concerns legal procedure, rather than matters of substantive law. Id.
See also Rodriguez Ferrere, supra note 226, at 109.
242 See WOOLF, supra note 33; Michalik, supra note 95, at 152–58.
243 For more on the shift and change of the paradigm, see Rabeea Assy, Briggs’s Online
Court and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 36 CIV. JUST. Q. 93, 100 (2017).
244 See generally id. (highlighting the importance of substantive law and access to justice).
245 See id. Also see provisions on the civil procedure law of England and Wales, which
include, inter alia, the following: “encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute
resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of such
procedure” and “helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case.” CPR, RULES &
PRACTICE DIRECTIONS, 1.4(e)–(f). See also WOOLF, supra note 33, §§ 2, 5, 6 (1995); Elizabeth G. Thornberg, Reaping What We Sow: Anti-Litigation Rhetoric, Limited Budgets and
Declining Support for Civil Courts, 30 CIV. JUST. Q. 74 (2011).
246 Michalik, supra note 95, at 152–55.
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alternative up until that point instantly became the principal route to conflict
resolution.
Following the Woolf reform, courts have reorganized so that the actual
management of the legal case has become incidental, whereas the primary objective of preliminary procedures is to bring the parties to consent to fair compromise.247 In this new role, the judge becomes an involved and active participant in this process.248 Various reform boards have recommended that rules
of civil procedure be adapted to suit this transformation.249 Among other
changes, the reform brought forward the pre-action protocols, adapted to different types of lawsuits, which oblige the parties to examine the alternatives
to litigation as opposed to the risks and probabilities concerning a possible
legal outcome.250 This preliminary preparation was intended to allow the parties to reach, at a very early stage, grounded conclusions and insights that
would lead them to an appropriate and suitable settlement. The rules that required early preparation of informed negotiation were accompanied by new
authority that allowed the judge to impose sanctions during litigation on parties that failed to fulfill the demands of the rules of civil procedure. The role
of the judge under these rules begins even before the case has started. As manager, the judge has the authority to lead parties to prepare in the best way
possible for the negotiation process.251 Among other advantages, this procedure spares the parties the need to turn to the court with various requests concerning discovery. At later stages, again according to the recommendations of
the Woolf committee, the parties are required to appear before the court in
pretrial conferences and directions hearings, during which the judge will verify with the parties and their attorneys that the various options of settling the
case are known to them. Preliminary hearings concerning the costs of litigation, also known as cost hearings, illustrate for the parties the high costs involved in litigation, thus creating another incentive to reach a settlement.
There is another unique mechanism of cost shifting, according to which a
party that has refused a settlement offer (which is not revealed before the
judge) will have to incur all of the legal costs if the court ruling at the end of
litigation is close to the settlement offer.252 These procedures are unique in
that they reduce the parties’ control over the process, reduce the level of adversarial rivalry, and incentivize cooperation between the parties.
247

CATHERINE ELLIOT & FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 511–17 (10th ed.
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Michalik, supra note 95, ¶ 4.5.2.
ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 247, at 516.
250 WOOLF, supra note 33, at 107; Susan Moloney, A New Approach to Civil Litigation?
The Implementation of the “Woolf Reforms” and Judicial Case Management, 2 JUD. STUD.
INST. J. 98, 101 (2001).
251 Michalik, supra note 95, at 164.
252 See discussion and sources cited supra note 79.
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Nevertheless, they do not make the judge more active in promoting settlement,
but rather promote settlement through the rules of civil procedure and the
managerial interface of the court system.
V. CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM
A. The Deficiency of the Judicial Sphere Under the Inquisitorial
Tradition
The adversarial judge has extensive leeway with regard to the integration
of inquisitorial-like techniques for the management of negotiation and the promotion of settlement. This leeway is supplemented by broad judicial discretion that characterizes common law systems. In contrast, the continental judge
is positioned within a relatively confined space with regards to the management of procedure and the range of discretion in the application of the law.
The truth-seeking process in the inquisitorial system is not divided into stages
and is linked to an active investigation not regulated through procedural rules
that leave room for incidental creativity. Even in applying the law, the judge
is perceived as the legislature’s mouthpiece and does not leave an individual
mark on his rulings. Thus, his rulings are perceived as a formal application of
the law, lacking discretion. In the absence of procedural leeway on the formal
level, a judge’s ability to apply conflict-resolution approaches is limited to the
that of specific rules and calls for little creative involvement.253 Still, there are
widespread developments in legislation, which allow judges within this tradition, and sometimes even obligate them, to conduct conflict-resolution procedures before the trial begins.254 In other words, continental judges may apply
a specific rule in order to promote settlement, and may also employ practices
they were trained to use, which have been adopted through legislation. Nevertheless, it is unreasonable to expect spontaneous developments of these
practices, as one occasionally finds in adversarial systems.
The inquisitorial judge learns of the details of the conflict at hand via what
the parties choose to present in writing. Even though judges maintain the authority to hold oral hearings and to conduct direct dialogue with the parties,
they rarely do so.255 This creates a formal and strict dynamic, one that makes
it difficult to form the desired discourse for examining each parties’ essential
interests, the roots of the conflict, the possible paths towards its consented
resolution, and other elements required in order to help the parties reach the
non-legal insights from which agreement may be reached. When the legal
253 As to the law applied in France, see Cadiet, supra note 77, at 318 n.101, § 7.5, at
323–24.
254 Sergio Chiarloni, Civil Justice and its Paradoxes: An Italian Perspective, in CIVIL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 32, at 280–86.
255 Cadiet, supra note 77, ¶ 3.4, at 300.
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code offers detailed rules against the backdrop of a strict obligation to rely
only on those rules in finding a solution, the development of informal thinking
becomes impossible.
It appears that even when the continental legal system examines possibilities for assimilating conflict-resolution procedures as an integral part of the
legal process, this shift does not carry over to a reform of the judicial role.
Italy, which has made great progress in assimilating conflict-resolution procedures both within and outside of the court system, still enforces strict legal
criteria concerning the character, skills, and experience of the judge-to-be. A
proposed reform relates to the judge’s ability to write reasoned decisions, to
understand the relevant code, and their ability to end as many cases as possible
in judgment. The reform does not propose examining the personality of
judges-to-be or focusing on the interpersonal and emotional qualifications that
may serve them in bringing parties to settle.256
The formal sphere of the civil law code system inherently places barriers
with respect to the possibility of open dialogue; the judges, bound by ruling
practices not founded on personification of the conflict, face difficulties in
adapting when they are asked to resolve conflicts in new ways rather than
through traditional adjudication. In addition, that the judge is directly exposed
to informal conversation between the parties, as well as possible admissions
on their behalf, might raise the parties’ concerns that what they say during this
stage may impact the judge’s final ruling if efforts to reach a settlement fail.257
Such concerns diminish the parties’ cooperation with settlement efforts of the
court which, in turn, harms the judge’s ability to bring them to a consented
resolution. Unlike the parties’ perception of the judge in common law systems—where the parties expect and experience significant involvement of the
court, to the extent that such involvement is the norm—the parties in continental legal systems expect very low, or even no, involvement of judges.258
Therefore, active participation of the judge directed towards settlement, or
statements made by judges based on interests rather than being investigative
or procedural in nature, may arouse distrust in the process itself and, accordingly, result in lack of cooperation. This stands in contrast to the form of dialogue that would take place within a common law courtroom.
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Chiarloni, supra note 254, at 280–86.
See supra note 16 for a criticism in this respect.
258 See supra note 253. See also Tania Sourdin, Five Reasons Why Judges Should Conduct Settlement Conferences, 37 MONASH U.L. REV. 145, 145–48 (describing the Australian experience).
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B. The Incorporation of Conflict Resolution Procedures Within the
Inquisitorial Legal System
Alongside the institutionalization of mediation as an integral part of the
adversarial legal system in common law countries,259 changes have also occurred in the perception of alternative dispute resolution procedures under the
inquisitorial tradition in continental countries.260 The hybrid framework enables a wider and more diverse spectrum for the application of ADR tools as
an outgrowth of, among other factors, the manner in which each tradition has
undergone change and revolution. While in common law systems the evolution of conflict-resolution procedures has been gradual, consistent, and is integrated into the sources upon which the system itself relies, including court
rulings, legal scholarship, and public committees,261 the integration of such
procedures in the civil code countries has been approached through codification and explicit legislation.262 Legal procedures such as the inherent powers
259

Cortés, supra note 79, at 56.
See Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23. On the development of ADR in Germany, see Peter Gottwald, Civil Justice Reform: Access, Cost, and Expedition. The German
Perspective, in CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 32, § 3.3, at 220–22, 230–32. On the
situation in Italy, see Chiarloni, supra note 254, at 288–90. See also Rina Bogoch & Ruth
Halperin Kaddari, Hakol Kol Hagishur, ach Hayadaim Yedei Hamisphat: al Hagishur veal
Nihul Girushin Beisrael [The Voice is the Voice of Mediation, But the Hands are the Hands
of the Law: Of Mediation and the Management of Divorce in Israel], 49 HAPRAKLIT 293
(2007) (Isr.). It is noted, however, that this is a process in the making, and a practice of
compromise is yet to be incorporated into the procedural law of many countries that implement the civil code system. See Cortés, supra note 79, at 59.
261 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6; ALBERSTEIN, THE THEORY OF MEDIATION, supra
note 35, at 95–106.
262 See generally Valentina Popova, The Mediation in the Bulgarian and European
Law, Bulgarian, European and International Civil Process, 9 CIV. PROC. REV. 43, 44–48
(2018). The Romanian legal system underwent a broad-ranging reform under which procedural rules were revised, including mediation proceedings, in the spirit of the novel EU
legislation. For a general review of Romanian law and the civil-code fundamentals thereof,
see Anamaria Corbescu, UPDATE: Doing Legal Research in Romania, GLOBALEX, §§ 1.1,
1.2, 1.3, 5.4, 6 (Feb. 2017), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Romania1.html. Romanian law applies the principles of mediation and judicial review on the settlement in a
detailed manner, inter alia, by Law No 192/2006, which imposes restrictions on the issues
with respect to which the parties are unable to enter into a mediation settlement, outlines
the content and form of mediation settlements, and sets out provisions with respect to the
judicial review which the courts are required to apply to mediation settlements and the
boundaries of such review. The legal system of Belarus has undergone a significant change
in this context. As of January 2014, the Mediation Law took effect, which required changes
to the preexisting codification that had been followed by the courts of Belarus. For further
details, see Belarus, 23 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 393 (1997); Tatyana Khodosevich & Nadia Shalygina, UPDATE: Legal Research in Belarus, GLOBALEX (Oct. 2013),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Belarus1.html. The instructions with respect to the
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of the court, for example, which in practice include an elaboration of judges’
discretion, require specific legislation, without which judges have no ability
to employ them.263
The ideas included in the European Directive264 provide the legal grounds
integrated in all European countries.265 One can find, therefore, similar, and
even identical, characteristics in state legislation dealing with referral to outof-court mediation procedures, and only in limited cases integration of mediation within the courtroom, which entails regulative change in the role of
judges. Accordingly, there has been a change in the perception of many countries—such as France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Romania, Belarus, and others—
which have created local legislation that includes assimilation of the ideology
of compromise.266 In France, for example, the judge is allowed—based on the
form of the discourse between the judge and the mediator are incorporated into the economic and general code, as is the manner of enforcement of mediation settlements and the
powers of the court to intervene therein. Economic Procedural Code of the Republic of
Belarus, No. 219-Z of December 15, 1998 [amended as of Jan. 5, 2016]; Code of Civil
Procedure of the Republic of Belarus, No. 238-Z of January 11, 1999 [as amended on May
27, 2021].
263 Jessica Liang, The Inherent Jurisdiction and Inherent Powers of International
Criminal Courts and Tribunals: An Appraisal of Their Application, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV.
375, 378–80 (2012).
264 See Directive 2008/52, supra note 17 (laying out the prototype for extensive national legislation). The Directive concerns certain aspects of mediation on civil and commercial matters and addresses an alternative dispute resolution proceeding for disputes
arising between residents of different countries. The Directive instructs the countries to
ensure the enforcement of mediation settlements, thereby establishing mediation as a significant and stable alternative. It denies the right to enter into a mediation settlement as
pertains to the waiver of inalienable rights, with respect to which it leaves the court to
function as the gatekeeper. In other words, from the outset, the Directive qualifies the freedom to enter into a settlement on certain terms and conditions, and presumably noncompliance therewith will require judicial intervention. However, the Directive does not specify the type and extent of judicial intervention and the criteria for application thereof in
each and every case. Id.
265 See Directive 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
September 2002 Concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services,
90/619/EEC, art. 15, 2002 O.J. (L271); Directive 2008/52, supra note 17.
266 An empirical study conducted in 2012 in dozens of countries that follow the civil
code system found that judicial mediation by the judge is the most limited dispute resolution process compared with other processes for compromise, and thus, while 27 countries
hold a mediation process adjacent to the courts; 35 countries hold a vast active private
mediation procedure; 30 countries support mediations conducted by and through various
authorities; and only 17 countries allow for the conduct of mediation by judges, whether
by way of internal rules integrated with regulations or by leaving the full discretion on the
conduct of a procedure for compromise with the judges themselves. See EUR. COMM’N FOR
THE EFFICIENCY OF JUST., REPORT ON “EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS – EDITION 2014 (2012
DATA): EFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF JUSTICE” 150–51 (2014), http://www.just.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/editia-2014-en.pdf.
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parties’ request—to make a ruling based on the code in accordance with considerations of justice (or “amiable compositeur”).267 The judge must always
prefer a method of settling interests by using mediation. Procedural or contractual justice procedures, which are not necessarily in accordance with the
legal truth that emerges from the investigation of relevant facts, have steered
the French legal system toward a dynamic of judicial mediation. Deviating
from the aspiration for truth toward a broader investigation of interests and
objectives has led France to a clear preference for conflict-resolution procedures as the primary course for resolving cases, rather than adjudication based
on inquisitorial, legal investigation.
In Spain, mediating procedures have been set for cases that deal with both
international trade and local lawsuits.268 The law does not create mandatory
mediation, but it incentivizes parties to choose a way of compromise. It does
so using the following tools: increasing the costs of litigation; funding mediation through legal aid; halting the period of limitation for the duration of mediation procedure; guaranteeing complete confidentiality of the mediation
procedure from the judge and the procedure;269 delaying the legal process until
mediation ends;270 and finally, turning the court into an active participant in
the process of mediation, as the court approves the mediation agreement and
gives it the validity of a court ruling.271
The Italian Civil Procedure Code has integrated several new tools that allow judges to promote settlement in cases brought before them.272 Among
other possibilities, a judge may request that the parties appear in a hearing to
be questioned freely, with the purpose of reaching a settlement.273 This is contrary to the existing norm in Italy where hearings are usually held only in the
presence of lawyers.274 Furthermore, the following rules have been introduced
into the civil procedure code: in hearings before the justice of the peace (i.e.,
small claims) in which the parties are not present, the lawyers are required to
have authorization to agree to a settlement;275 until the end of the preliminary
stage, the parties themselves can ask the judge to conduct free investigation
267 Art. 12, ¶ 1, New Civil Procedural Code (Fr.). See Cadiet, supra note 77, § 7.5, at
323–24.
268 Law on Mediation § 1, B.O.E. 2012, 5 (Spain) (incorporating into Spanish Law the
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/52/EC, on Certain Aspects of Mediation
in Civil and Commercial Matters).
269 See id. at art. 9.
270 See id. at art. 4.
271 Aura Esther Vilalta & Rosa Pérez Martell, Overview of the New Normative on Mediation in Spain, 6 AM. J. MEDIATION 9 (2012).
272 See generally Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 301–03.
273 Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 301. See also Art. 185, Italian Civil Procedural Code (C.p.c.).
274 Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 301.
275 Art. 317, Italian Civil Procedural Code (C.p.c.).
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in an attempt to settle the case;276 the judge is allowed to present to the parties
a settlement offer during any stage of the legal process, including during appeal277 or, alternatively, to issue a detailed, binding mediation order in cases
she believes are suitable for mediation.278 It seems that in practice, Italian
judges do not use these practices very often and, therefore, any change in the
Italian legal tradition is markedly slow and gradual.279 Nonetheless, in particular courts in Italy, judges collaborate with mediation experts and academics
to promote settlement. In these courts, one can identify an increase in the rate
of settlements and in the number of cases that are referred to out-of-court mediation.280
In addition, one of the central reforms the Italian legal system has undergone during recent years, in an attempt to deal with significant delays in the
courts, is the introduction of mandatory mediation.281 This legislation sets
mandatory mediation prior to the beginning of civil litigation in many types
of cases. It also introduces cost-related incentives so that, if a party refused a
mediation proposal and receives a judgment at the end of litigation that is
worse than what was offered in mediation, that party must pay the costs of the
other party as well as a special fine.282 Unlike similar legislation that has been
passed in Ireland, with the purpose of reducing the cost of litigation,283 the
purpose of the Italian rule, according to the legislature, is to save judicial time
and help shorten legal procedures.284 While judges are allowed to promote
settlement within the courtroom, in practice, they tend to outsource by referring parties to out-of-court mediators.285
In Germany, the legislature introduced the authority of the mediating judge
into the code as well as to the rules of ethics for judges. During the deliberations over the Mediation Act, efforts were made to include the authority of the
mediating judge, but the final draft that was eventually approved did not
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Id. at art. 185.
Id. at art. 185bis.
278 See Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 302.
279 Giuseppe De Palo & Lauren Keller, Mediation in Italy: Alternative Dispute Resolution for All, in MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
669, 687 (Klaus J. Hopt & Felix Steffek eds., 2012).
280 Id. at 679, 680, 692.
281 Arts. 13–14 Decreto Legislativo 4 marzo 2010, n.28, G.U. May 3, 2010, n.53 (It.).
282 De Palo & Keller, supra note 279, at 676–77.
283 § 2(2)(b) Mediation Act 2017 (Act No. 27/2017) (Ir.) (“[T]he need for the expeditious resolution of such disputes in a manner that minimises the costs of resolving those
disputes for the parties concerned.”).
284 Giuliana Romualdi, Problem-Solving Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Italian Legal Context, 14 UTRECHT L. REV. 52, 52–63 (2018). See also Paula Moreschini & Gabrielle Saltzberg, Mediation Goes Mainstream in Italy, INT’L DISP. RESOL.
NEWS 2 n.4 (2012).
285 Alberstein & Zimerman, supra note 23, at 301.
277

148

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

[Vol. 51:1

include this.286 And so, while the Mediation Act relates to out-of-court mediation only, the authority of judges as mediators have been integrated into the
rules of procedure.287 Judicial mediation had proved itself in several states in
Germany; over 70% of the cases in which judges acted as mediators ended in
a settlement.288 The judge who advances settlement is defined in the rules of
procedure as a conciliation judge in order to, among other reasons, differentiate her from the mediator, who deals with conflict resolution in the private
sector.289 Yet this definition does not prevent judges from employing mediation-like procedures290 in working towards conflict resolution, including legal
evaluation and prediction as well as referral to arbitration. As of January 2013,
all civil courts in Germany, including unique settings such as social or administrative courts, employ conciliation judges whose powers are fixed in section
278(5) of the Civil Procedure Code.291 In the absence of unified rules for the
training of conciliation judges alongside the integration of mediation procedures in the federal courts, mediation-conciliation procedures in the different
states differ from one another. Still, these procedures do share common characteristics, including: the conciliation judge is trained as a mediator; these
judges are not allowed to rule on the cases in which they mediate; judges may
draft and edit settlement agreements; third parties who feel affected by the
settlement agreement can choose to join it; the conciliation procedure is always accompanied by the parties’ attorneys and judges are not allowed to
conciliate in a case where there are unrepresented parties; conciliation procedures are confidential, voluntary, and are not open to the public; there is no
unification regarding how the parties consent to the process and each state has
its own consent rules; judicial conciliation does not entail special court fees;
judges are allowed—as a unique working tool—to offer the parties a

286 Anne-Ruth Moltmann-Willisch, Judges in Mediation in Germany. How Would a
Judge Become an Excellent Mediator?, 2 AKV EURÓPAI SZEMLE [EUR. REV. ALT.
CONFLICT MGMT. & DISP. RESOL.] 78, 78–79 (2018).
287
Id.; Mediationsgesetz, MediationsG [Mediation Act], July 21, 2012,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] at 1577 (Ger.) (incorporating the provisions of the EU Directive (EG2008)). The law was revised in 2017. Section 1 defines the mediation proceeding, Section 2 prescribes the objectives of the mediator, whereas the other sections concern
the issues of confidentiality and training of the mediator.
288 Moltmann-Willisch, supra note 286, at 78–81.
289 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 278, para. 5 (Ger.) (“The
court may refer the parties for the conciliation hearing, as well as for further attempts at
resolving the dispute, to a judge delegated for this purpose, who is not authorized to take a
decision (Güterichter/conciliation judge). The conciliation judge may avail himself of all
methods of conflict resolution, including mediation.”).
290 Moltmann-Willisch, supra note 286, at 79–80.
291 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], § 278, para. 5 (Ger.).
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settlement that is not a binding ruling but rather bears contractual status and
implications only.292
While there is no precise definition of which cases are suitable for mediation, more than a third of the cases in the Berlin Court of Appeals that deal
with construction-related issues293 enter mediation. Similarly, cases involving
public authorities are often referred to mediation.294 The parties themselves
can request to participate in judicial conciliation and even choose the identity
of the conciliation judge. The conciliation procedure may take place during
any stage of the legal procedure, and even after many years of litigation.295
The perception of the conciliation judge in Germany is particularly interesting given the qualities that the judge undertakes in moving from ruling
judge to conciliating judge. For example, the conciliation judge is required to
possess the ability to change strict rules, to shift from “positive neutrality” to
the state of “equally subjective.”296 This setting drives the parties closer together and creates the desired relationship from which consent to a settlement
may evolve.297 The judge must display honesty and authenticity in his proposals and show empathy and sincere concern for the parties’ interests, including those that are therapeutic and extra-legal.298 It seems that the semantics of the definition of the judge as conciliator rather than mediator has no
significance to the practice of the German judge as conflict resolver.299
Legislated on May 5, 2006 and effective as of June 29, 2013, Romanian
Law No.192 applies the principles of mediation and judicial review of settlement agreements in a detailed arrangement.300 The law requires that the
292

Moltmann-Willisch, supra note 286, at 80.
Id. at 81. In Berlin, judicial mediation proceedings are conducted for 600-700 cases
per year in all civil instances (3%–5% of all cases), 500 of which are at the court of appeals.
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294 Id. at 80–81.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 83. See generally Ronit Zamir, Mitos Hanetraliut shel Hamegasher: Meei
Maso Panim Lenesihat Panim Shava [The Myth of the Mediator’s Neutrality: From Impartiality to Equal Partiality], 16 L. & BUS. 411 (2014) (Isr.).
297 See Moltmann-Willisch, supra note 286, at 83.
298 See id.
299 A review of the practice that developed in Germany indicates that, while the definition in the law refers to conciliation, the judge’s actions are not limited or routed to the
narrow channel of dispute resolution. Id. at 80; see also Thomas Trenczek & Serge Loode,
Mediation “Made in Germany”: A Quality Product, 23.1 AUSTRALASIAN DISP. RESOL. J.
61, 62 (2012).
300 Law 192/2006 on Mediation and the Organization of the Mediator Profession published in the Official Gazette no.441/22.05.2006 (Rom.) (including through amendment
extensive legislation on mediation, including Law 370/2009 (Rom.); Ordinance 13/2010
Measures to Encourage Creation of New Jobs and Reduction of Unemployment published
in the Official Gazette no.136/01.03.2010 (Rom.); Law 202/2010 Family Code published
in the Official Gazette no.174.26.10.2010 (Rom.); Law 76/2012 on the Implementation of
293
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mediator will present the parties the procedure of mediation and its advantages.301 Initially, the law stated that if a party should refuse to participate
in this preliminary meeting the court may dismiss the lawsuit entirely.302 This
legislation was held unconstitutional in a later decision of the Romanian constitutional court.303 Yet there is no legislation that authorizes judges to mediate
in the courtroom, nor are there rules that encourage judges to try and settle the
cases before them by ways other than traditional judicial ruling.
In Belarus, as of January 2014, a mediation law is in effect which entails
changes to the existing code based on which general and financial courts were
operating.304 Article 170 of the Economic Code allows judges to explain to
the parties, during preparation for trial, that they have the right to turn to a
mediator—a completely voluntary procedure.305 The dialogue and ongoing
coordination between the court and the mediation process are much more extensive relative to the norm under common law legal systems, and the instructions concerning the nature of dialogue between the judge and the mediator
are integrated into the code. The parties have the right to turn to mediation
only before the court has started dealing with the case on the merits, during
the preliminary hearing.306 If they turn to mediation, the court rules that so
long as the mediation procedure is in progress, the court will not issue a final
opinion,307 and the tax authority returns the fully paid state fee to the parties.308
The law in Belarus, which encourages the initial connection between the court
and mediation procedures—in a controlled way—determines the manner of
Law no.134/2014 on the Civil Procedure Code published in the Official Gazette
no.76/25.5.2012 (Rom.); Law 115/2012 (Rom.); Emergency Ordinance 90/2012 (Rom.);
Emergency Ordinance 4/2013; Law 214/2013 (Rom.); Emergency Ordinance 80/2013
(Rom.)).
301 Art. 29, Law 192/2006 on Mediation and the Organization of the Mediator Profession published in the Official Gazette no.441/22.05.2006 (Rom.).
302 Christian-Radu Chereji & Constantin-Adi Gavrilă, Don’t Rush, WOLTERS KLUWER:
KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2015), http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/03/02/dont-rush/; Law 115/2012 (Rom.); Emergency Ordinance 90/2012
(Rom.).
303 Chereji & Gavrilă, supra note 302; Curtea Constituțională a României [Constitutional Court of Romania], Decision No. 266 of May 7, 2014 (Rom.).
304 See generally Economic Procedural Code of the Republic of Belarus, No. 219-Z of
December 15, 1998 [amended as of Jan. 5, 2016]; Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic
of Belarus, No. 238-Z of January 11, 1999 [as amended on May 27, 2021].
305 Economic Procedural Code of the Republic of Belarus, art. 170, No. 219-Z of December 15, 1998 [amended as of Jan. 5, 2016].
306 Id. at art. 40-1; see also Law on Mediation of the Republic of Belarus, art. 11, No
58-Z of July 12, 2013 [amended as of Jan. 5, 2016].
307 Economic Procedural Code of the Republic of Belarus, art. 40-1, No. 219-Z of December 15, 1998 [amended as of Jan. 5, 2016].
308 Tax Code of the Republic of Belarus (Special Part), art. 292, ¶ 2.5, No. 71-Z of
December 29, 2009 [amended as of Dec. 31, 2021].
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enforcing the mediation agreement when a party to mediation does not fulfill
his obligations under the agreement. The party who upholds the agreement
has the right to turn to the Economic Court and request a validation document
that mandates the full execution of the mediation agreement.309 Nevertheless,
along with the deepening of the perception of out-of-court mediation procedures, and the cooperation of the courts with such procedures in general, the
code is silent with regards to judges’ own authority to conduct conflict resolution procedures within the courtroom. In that respect, the Belarusian code
sets very clear boundaries as to what is allowed and what is forbidden within
the courtroom, thus maintaining the traditional role of the judge.
It is evident, then, that dispute-resolution procedures have been integrated
in the legislation of numerous countries acting within the inquisitorial tradition, both by way of outsourcing, organizational collaboration with the court
system, and within the courts themselves. Subsequently, judges in these systems are exposed to dispute resolution techniques and witness forms of dialogue not previously known to them, vis-à-vis external mediators. This is not
a trivial development, since dispute-resolution procedures have lengthened
the time needed to resolve cases, and one of the central characteristics of the
inquisitorial legal system is the fast and purposeful resolution of legal conflicts.310 Furthermore, the very referral of cases to mediation and the cooperation between the courts and alternative-procedure providers reflects a

309 Economic Procedural Code of the Republic of Belarus arts. 40-1, 262-1, No. 219-Z
of December 15, 1998 [amended as of Jan. 5, 2016]; Alexandra Habriyanchik, Concerning
Highlights of Mediation Agreements Execution in Belarus, 22 BIAŁOSTOCKIE STUDIA
PRAWNICZE 273, 277–78 (2017). The motion will be filed within six months of the expiration of the obligation performance period clause specified in the settlement itself, and it
shall be heard by the court within one month of its receipt. Id. at art. 259.
310 Whereas referral to mediation in common law countries is intended, inter alia, to
reduce the system’s workload and lessen the expectancy and duration of litigation, in civil
law the use of mediation proceedings delays the judicial ruling which, were it not for the
referral to mediation, would be concluded within the space of several months. In Germany,
for example, an average duration of first instance proceedings is between 8–11 months.
Jochen Lehmann & Markus Andrees, Germany, in LITIGATION & DISPUTE RESOLUTION
LAWS AND REGULATIONS 2022, GLI: GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/litigation-and-dispute-resolution-laws-and-regulations/germany. In Belarus, civil cases at first instances shall be considered no later than two months
from the date of submission the application to the court, Code of Civil Procedure of the
Republic of Belarus, art. 158, No. 238-3 of January 11, 1999 (amended as of May 27,
2021), and one month in economic cases in the relevant circumstances, Economic Procedural Code of the Republic of Belarus, art. 175, No. 219-3 of December 15, 1998 (amended
as of July 25, 2021). The court may suspend the proceedings if the parties conclude a written agreement on the application of mediation, Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of
Belarus, art. 160, No. 238-3 of January 11, 1999 (amended as of May 27, 2021); Economic
Procedural Code of the Republic of Belarus, arts. 40-1, ¶ 2 & 152, No. 219-3 of December
15, 1998 (amended as of July 25, 2021).
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concession regarding the traditional role of the judge as one who manages the
litigation in practice and actively works to seek the truth needed for the determination of the case. Moving legal disputes to dialogic, consensual processes
that are completely managed by the parties themselves reflects a conceptual
shift that should not be underestimated.
VI. SHIFTING THE CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE ADVERSARIAL PROCEDURE:
FROM FULL ADJUDICATION TO DETERMINATION DURING PRETRIAL
The expansion of the authority of judges during pretrial within adversarial
legal systems,311 judges’ inquisitorial-like involvement during this stage, the
number of pretrial hearings, the great significance of early discovery procedures, the determination of disagreements, and early statements of the parties—all of these have shifted the balance of the adversarial legal procedure.
The center of gravity, traditionally grounded in the evidentiary stage, has
shifted to the preliminary stages.312 New procedures and regulations have allowed the parties to internalize early on their actual legal standing and recognize the court’s position regarding the chances of finding in their favor. This,
in turn, incentivizes parties to reach agreements during pretrial, in light of
early predictions.313 The expansion of discovery, as well as the minimal intervention of appellate courts in rulings concerning discovery, have changed litigants’ perceptions concerning the possibility of attributing greater weight to
interim decisions during later stages of litigation. Appellate courts, therefore,
in their refusal to frequently or widely interfere with decisions having to do
with early stages of litigation, have played a role in shifting the center of gravity of the legal process to its earlier stages.
This shift in the center of the adversarial legal procedure into its early
stages was grounded in a procedural bind. On the one hand, the rules of civil
procedure, both in the United States and in Israel, have broadened judges’
authority in courts of first instance to determine milestones from which the
probable outcome of the case can be inferred during its early stages. On the
other hand, the causes of intervention of appellate courts in such decisions
were limited. This procedural bind has accelerated decision-making during
the early stages of disputes and has led to a somewhat contradictory phenomenon: the increased certainty regarding final expected judicial rulings, a result
of preliminary rulings, had led parties to settle, as opposed to the prior legal
311 The New Civil Procedure Regulations underscore the managerial function of the
active judge, inter alia, for the purpose of leading the parties to a settlement as early as in
the first pretrial hearing. § 63B(17), New Civil Procedure Regulations, supra note 15.
312 See ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 21.
313 Yeazell, supra note 23, at 639 (“[T]hese judicial decisions provide a framework
within which the parties decide how to evaluate settlement or abandonment of the underlying lawsuits.”).
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reality in which the uncertainty regarding the final outcome served as an incentive to reach agreement and settle cases.
The shift of the center of gravity in the process has necessarily led to several changes in the behavior of parties in managing litigation: litigants include
evidence and argue a full argument during the preliminary stages of litigation;
pleadings are made as to provide the judge with openings for mediating the
case; expert opinions are attached to the statement of claims, and the parties
do not wait to submit opposing expert opinions or affidavits; many litigants
hire lawyers who specialize in negotiation early in trials and lawyers who specialize in managing litigation when mediation fails; and the judge arrives at
the first hearing already proficient in all details of the case and prepared to
learn from the parties the remaining details required to resolve the case in an
informed manner that suits the parties’ interests. In this respect, it should be
noted that dividing the payment of court fees into two stages assists the parties
in deciding to end the case through resolution, knowing that the fees they have
paid will be returned even during the late stages of litigation. The shifting of
the center of gravity has created a new realm of decision-making, one that is
based on juridical grounds and acknowledgement of the realm of uncertainty
which brings with it a complete set of novel and creative possibilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Modern courts developed along two central legal traditions, the adversarial
and the inquisitorial. These traditions clearly express different attitudes towards the relation between consent and authority and between dispute resolution and legal determination according to the law. The gradual blurring of
boundaries between these two traditions, and the reciprocal stimulation between them, along with various reforms in adversarial legal systems that led
to out-of-court dispute resolution, all gave rise to the development of new judicial practices that focus on the resolution of disputes through settlement and
consent.
In this Article, we examined these practices from a comparative perspective. We have shown how in a particular context of an adversarial legal system—with certain inquisitorial powers and an informal platform—one may
find the necessary conditions for the development of rich judicial conflictresolution activity. In another context, one in which an inquisitorial legal system assimilates conflict-resolution processes into the court system, this application will most likely remain formal and will only be minimally expressed in
judges’ self-perception of their professional roles. The degree and nature of
judicial conflict-resolution activity will be impacted, therefore, by the essence
of the legal system as well as the managerial reforms that have been conducted
within it. In addition, we have shown how in adversarial systems, the legal
procedure does not “vanish” but rather retreats to the preliminary stages of the
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process and is expressed in rich judicial activity of judges during pretrial hearings and throughout the process. Such judicial activity, which relies on the
inquisitorial tools reviewed in this Article, is aimed at finding middle-ground
solutions which balance the formal rules with additional considerations.
Judges who operate within such a framework can include in their decisionmaking processes intricate considerations and act, in effect, as regulators and
problem solvers.
Managerial reforms, such as the one presented in the Israel’s new procedural rules,314 may alter the balance and narrow the realm of judicial intervention when the attempt to resolve the dispute is based on directing cases to outof-court mediation or, alternatively, on the collection of information that will
impact the out-of-court negotiation towards settlement. The new realm of the
adversarial, conflict-resolving judge who continues to rule on cases that have
not otherwise reached a resolution (despite various incentives) is a unique
arena. In this evolving sphere, judges can solve disputes under the auspices of
their judicial authority in a manner that extends beyond technique or formal
application. This conceptual shift in the definition of the role of judges goes
hand in hand with the shift in adversarial procedures whereby parties focus
their evidentiary efforts on presenting the full picture that supports their version at early stages of the process, with the expectation that the pretrial hearing
will be utilized by the judge to provide settlement offers. The development of
this sphere bears great potential for the resolution of complex conflicts and
for the development of new hybrid models in both law and mediation.

314

See supra Part IV(C)(i).

